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A PUBLIC OPTION FOR EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS
Allison K. Hoffman, Howell E. Jackson, and Amy B. Monahan *
Abstract
Following the 2020 presidential election, health care reform discussions have
centered on two competing proposals: Medicare for All and an individual public
option (“Medicare for all who want it”). Interestingly, these two proposals take
starkly different approaches to employer-provided health coverage, long the
bedrock of the U.S. health care system and the stumbling block to many prior reform
efforts. Medicare for All abolishes employer-provided coverage, while an individual
public option leaves it untouched.
This Article proposes a novel solution that finds a middle ground between these
two extremes: an employer public option. In contrast to the more familiar public
option proposal, which would offer government sponsored health insurance directly
to individuals, our plan creates a public option for employers, who can select a
public plan—based on Medicare and altered to meet the needs of working
populations—instead of a private health plan for their employees. Employer-based
private health coverage is in decline and increasingly leaves workers vulnerable.
Our proposal offers a gradual way to loosen reliance on this system.
We review the policy, regulatory, fiscal, and business arguments in favor of this
form of public option, which we argue is less disruptive than Medicare for All but
more impactful than an individual public option. Because employer take up would
be gradual and voluntary, our plan has lower fiscal costs and should face less
resistance from employees and vested interests than Medicare for All. Over time, if
the plan meets employers’ and employees’ needs, more people would be covered by
a public option, moving away from over-reliance on private employer plans and
toward something akin to Medicare-for-Many in a less politically, legally, and
fiscally fraught way.
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to health policy, two opposing truths are evident. Fundamental
change is needed and fundamental change is impossible. The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) addressed some major gaps in how Americans pay for
health care. Perhaps its biggest accomplishment was to expand the Medicaid
program, which provides medical care for lower-income individuals and families.
The ACA’s efforts to reform the private market, while remarkable politically, have
had less impact. The ACA did little to lay the groundwork in the United States for
the longer-term structures needed to pay for universal health care efficiently and
equitably.
What this Article sets out to do is to build on existing policy ideas to offer a
foundation for more productive and fundamental change in American health care
financing while being cautious not to proceed at a pace or in a direction that is
fiscally irresponsible, politically fraught, or simply impractical. We propose that
employers be given the opportunity to provide health insurance coverage for their
employees through a Medicare-based public health insurance option. Our proposal
will disappoint those who would like to see a swift move to Medicare for All.
Likewise, it entails more change than preferred by those who are used to, or profiting
from, the current system. In other words, what we propose is probably not anyone’s
first choice. Yet, it offers transformative potential while avoiding unnecessary
disruption, and the possibility of a consensus path forward on health care reform.
The 2020 Democratic primaries featured two major health policy reform ideas.
Neither was universally satisfying and the contrast between the two proved divisive.
Intriguingly, the two individuals who each represented one of these ideas are now
President and Vice President of the United States.
The first idea was Medicare for All (MFA), endorsed by Vice President Kamala
Harris, as well as Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. If designing from scratch
today, this option that is closer to what exists in peer nations would most certainly
produce a lower cost system with higher outcomes. 1 Yet, in moving towards a
universal public program from today’s status quo, MFA would inevitably dislocate
people from familiar employer-sponsored health plans to which they are loyal,
whether deservedly or not. MFA was accordingly demonized as antithetical to
individual autonomy and free choice. It raised the specter of government overreach
and evoked uncomfortable memories of President Obama’s much repeated
assurance that under the ACA people who like their health care could keep it. 2
The price tag for MFA proved to be an equally substantial impediment. The cost
of operating a fully implemented MFA program was estimated to run into the
1
Roosa Tikkanen & Melinda K. Abrams, U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective, 2019: Higher
Spending,
Worse
Outcomes?,
Commonwealth
Fund
Issue
Brief
(Jan.
30,
2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/jan/us-health-care-global-perspective-2019
(“The U.S. spends more on health care as a share of the economy — nearly twice as much as the average OECD
country — yet has the lowest life expectancy and highest suicide rates among the 11 nations.”).
2
See Angie Drobnic Holan, Lie of the Year: ‘If You Like Your Health Care Plan, You Can Keep It,’
POLITIFACT.COM (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.politifact.com/article/2013/dec/12/lie-year-if-you-like-your-healthcare-plan-keep-it/.
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trillions of dollars, necessitating a substantial increase in federal taxes. To be sure,
comparative evidence suggests that a well-managed public health care financing
system would reduce the overall health care spending in the United States. 3
Moreover, standard labor economics predicts that universal coverage could help
workers by reducing the share of their compensation consumed by ever rising health
care spending. 4 These defenses of MFA are, however, complicated and depend upon
assumptions about market adjustments and economies of scale that are difficult to
convey in academic seminars, much less presidential debates or twitter feeds. For
many, the specter of higher taxes for MFA drowned out all else.
The second major health policy idea was incremental expansion, building on the
successes of the ACA. This was the approach embraced by President Joe Biden,
unsurprisingly in light of the role he played as Vice President when the ACA was
signed into law. Although the details differed among candidates, the defining feature
of most incremental reform plans was a public option based on Medicare. Mayor
Pete Buttigieg aptly coined it “Medicare for all who want it.” 5 This approach leaves
employer-based health plans largely untouched, while increasing offerings in the
individual market. These public option proposals were targeted narrowly at the
population most in need of coverage – the uninsured who are not offered employerbased coverage, who are ineligible for Medicaid, and who had not purchased
coverage in the ACA’s reformed individual marketplaces. Most simply, the idea was
that a public option, based on Medicare, would be added into those marketplaces
and would compete with private plans already offered. In contrast to MFA, the main
selling points were, first, that this approach retains a high degree of individual
autonomy and, second, it massively reduced the fiscal costs to the federal
government as compared to MFA proposals. Importantly, it also left the entrenched
employer-based system untouched.
Yet, on the flipside, creating a public option for individuals would reach only a
tiny fraction of the population. 6 This incremental building would not address
structural problems in the system. It is a layer of plaster spread gingerly across a
crumbling wall. Even though some public option proposals engage to a limited
degree with employer-sponsored plans, none of the major versions advanced in the
Democratic primaries envisioned any significant movement away from our reliance
on traditional employer-provided health plans and toward a more streamlined
healthcare financing system.
It is this feature of current public option proposals that motivated us to ask
whether we can do better. Health policy experts in the U.S. have long lamented the
Tikkanen & Abrams, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177
(discussing the fungibility of compensation in cash and via benefits).
5
Scott Simon & Heidi Glenn, ‘Just The Right Policy’: Pete Buttigieg ‘Medicare For All Who Want It’ Plan,
NPR Morning Edition (Nov. 8, 2019) (interview with Pete Buttigieg regarding his health plan proposal during the
2019-2020 Democratic primaries).
6
According to a review of the most prominent health care reforms of democratic presidential candidates
updated in February 2020, the Biden public option proposal would have expanded coverage by only 15 to 20 million.
See Primary Care: Estimating Democratic Candidates’ Health Care Plans, COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE
FEDERAL BUDGET, (Feb. 26, 2020), http://www.crfb.org/papers/primary-care-estimating-democratic-candidateshealth-plans.
3
4
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centrality of employer-sponsored health insurance as an accident of history that has
become increasingly engrained over time, due to its favorable treatment by the tax
code and a series of other policy decisions. 7
Although having a connection between the workplace and health care is no
global anomaly, the American way of tying health benefits to a job is unique and
does not work well for many people, increasingly so as the gig economy grows.
Employer-sponsored health insurance coverage has become less generous over time,
leaving households vulnerable to unmanageable health care expenses, especially as
this coverage comprises an increasing share of workers’ total compensation. 8 And it
has become a major stumbling block—we think the primary stumbling block—to
more productive structural change, which is starkly needed now more than ever.
The United States has the most expensive, inefficient, and inequitable health
care system among its OECD peer nations. 9 We spend twice as much as the average
OECD nation and get worse outcomes than most on critical metrics, like life
expectancy, chronic disease burden, and avoidable death. 10 What drives high
healthcare spending is high prices (we use less care per capita than most other
countries). 11 Prices are high because of a fragmented financing system and
consolidation among providers, who at this point can all but set their reimbursement
rates in negotiation with private payers, even the largest ones. 12
The three of us (experts respectively in health law and policy; financial
regulation, consumer protection, and federal budget policy; and employee benefits
and tax law and policy) have come to believe that the necessary first step toward
fixing how we pay for health care in the United States is to shift gradually away
from a system of private employer-based health insurance. We think the best way to
do that is to offer employers the opportunity to release themselves from the burden
of designing and administering health care benefits for their employees through the
creation of a different kind of public option that presents the opportunity for highvalue coverage at a lower cost than the status quo.
In this Article, we make the case for a public option designed intentionally and
primarily for employers as an alternative to private insurance plans for their
employees. Employers could choose to enroll their workforce in a public plan, based
on Medicare, instead of having to design and administer their own private plan. We
advocate for focusing first on large employers in order to take advantage of these
employers’ relative expertise in health insurance and because such employers cover
a majority of the individuals with employer-based coverage, making it easier to roll
out and test a new approach. 13
7
See Timothy Jost, Access to Health Insurance and Health Benefits in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH
LAW (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman, and William M. Sage, eds. 2017).
8
See Part I.C, infra.
9
Tikkanen and Abrams, supra note 1.
10
Id.
11
Id. (showing lower rates of physician visits, similar hospitalization, but greater use of MRI scans per capita).
12
See Part II.A, infra.
13
In 2019, two thirds of private sector employees worked for firms with more than 100 employees with over
46 % at firms with over 1000 employer and a similar share of ESI coverage provided in these categories of firms.
These estimates are derived from AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
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If even a handful of large employers chose to participate in a public option, it
could provide valuable information about the benefits and costs savings possible
from a national system of health care financing. 14 The experience gained through
this transition – including understanding the number and type of employers that
choose to opt into the public option – would offer compelling evidence on what
might be the highest-value way to get employees health insurance, revealed through
the voluntary, and hopefully educated, choices made by employers with substantial
expertise in choosing health care plans.
If it works, gradually and organically, more employers—large and small—
would opt in, eventually producing a less disjointed and expensive way of paying
for and providing health care. While our approach would not likely result in
Medicare for All, it might possibly deliver something like Medicare for Many More
or Medicare for Most.
We present in this Article a basic concept for an employer-based public option.
Arguments in favor are multi-faceted and compelling. Employers offer an efficient
distribution channel to reach both the presently insured and also some of the
remaining uninsured. According to recent estimates, 154.7 million non-elderly
individuals had employer-sponsored health insurance as compared with 18.5 million
with individual coverage 15 and roughly 29 million uninsured (the remainder of the
population already has public coverage). 16 In other words, three times more people
have coverage through an employer than the sum of current individual market
enrollees and the uninsured. That means an employer public option has greater
potential scale and, in turn, ability to streamline the overall financing system. It
would likely also reduce the number of uninsured overall. Recent surveys reveal that
now, unlike before the ACA, the majority of uninsured people are employed either
full time or part time. 17 Some of these workers are offered workplace coverage that
they cannot afford and others are not offered it at all. This segment will only grow
as the gig economy and other forms of precarious work expand. A public option for
employers can be tailored to incentivize employers to extend coverage to previously
excluded workers and can subsidize low-income workers’ share of the costs of
coverage.
An employer public option also offers significant fiscal advantages. Current
employer and employee contributions for employer-sponsored health insurance can
HUM.
SERV.,
Medical
Expenditure
Panel
Survey
(2018),
https://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/quick_tables_search.jsp?component=2&subcomponent=
1&year=2018&tableSeries=-1&tableSubSeries=&searchText=&searchMethod=1; see also KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2020 ANNUAL SURVEY (2019), files.kff.org/attachment/Report-EmployerHealth-Benefits-Annual-Survey-2020. [hereinafter KFF Employer Health Benefits 2020].
14
For example, if one focuses on just the employees covered by the top ten ESI programs as reported on
ERISA forms in 2018, covered employees total more than 4.2 million with covered household members no doubt a
multiple of that number. The largest reporting plan –Walmart Inc. Associates' Health and Welfare Plan – reports
over 1.5 million employees covered. Estimates derived from data downloaded from https://freeerisa.com/ .
15
Health Insurance Coverage of Nonelderly 0-64, THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/nonelderly-064/?dataView=1&currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc
%22%7D, last visited Dec. 23, 2020.
16
See Kaiser Family Found., Issue Brief: Key Facts about the Uninsured (Dec. 2019).
17
See text accompanying notes 101-103, infra.
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be retained—in whole or part—to finance a significant share of this form of public
option. Indeed, if the cost savings of Medicare over private coverage are preserved
even in part, employers and employees should both come out ahead financially.
Perhaps even more important, the need for higher taxes to support this transition will
be dramatically lower than those required under other leading reform proposals, as
payments made to the Medicare system for this kind of public option would be
accounted for as a voluntary exchange transaction – technically an offsetting
government collection – and not a tax and spending program.
Employers would be free to choose whether or not to participate, as consistent
with norms of autonomy as is the choice a company faces today when it decides
whether to ship its goods with the U.S. Postal System as opposed to Federal Express
or to prioritize employee travel by Amtrak rather than commercial airlines.
Employers, especially large employers, are comparatively well equipped to evaluate
the relative value of health plans, while taking into account their employees’ needs
and preferences. While a public option is usually touted on the grounds that private
insurers “need real competition,” 18 competition works best when the consumers
understand their choices. A mountain of evidence shows that individuals struggle
to do so when making health insurance decisions. 19 Although not perfect, corporate
human resources departments can better navigate alternatives.
There are good reasons to believe that many employers, both small and large,
would choose to participate in a public option, even if there may be some initial
hurdles to overcome. In many respects, it is anomalous that hundreds of thousands
of employers must be in the business of providing and annually updating health
insurance programs for their employees. Employers that choose to offer a group
health plan in the current environment must manage health care costs that outpace
inflation, and must do so within a highly regulated and complex legal environment.
The possibility for relief from this financial and regulatory morass would motivate
some employers to select a public option, so long as their employees were
guaranteed high-quality coverage.
No doubt, the political lift will be herculean. Certain vested interests – most
obviously providers and private health insurance companies – will resist an initiative
of this sort intuiting, correctly, that it would mean lower reimbursement rates than
they currently enjoy from private health plans. Medical providers, from hospitals to
doctors to medical device and pharmaceutical companies, who gain great profit off
the current system will fight against it. Even labor unions who might support the
idea on a blank slate could resist it if they saw the effort as threatening the loss of
bargained-for health benefits. But to the extent that there is political will to make
progress on national health care reform, which will regardless of the specific policy
platform see resistance from these same groups, a public option for employers
should be seriously considered because it could spark more than just marginal
improvements.

Press Release, JoeBiden.com, Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations 31 (Aug. 2020), at
https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf
19
See Part I.C, infra.
18

7

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3787675

This Article is organized as follows. In Part I, we provide a brief overview of
the U.S. health care finance system and review the leading proposals for health
reform – Medicare for All and an individual public option. We then provide an
overview of the current state of employer-provided coverage and its challenges. In
Part II, we make the basic case for an employer public option and detail its key
design features. We also consider in Part II the likelihood that employers will
voluntarily choose to participate in such a public option. In Part III, we focus on the
fiscal aspects of a public option for employers, comparing it to the widely publicized
scoring estimates for prominent Medicare for All proposals as well as the more
limited work that has been done on the budgetary scoring of other public option
proposals. As explained in this section, the voluntary nature of a public option for
employers has a dramatic impact on consequences of this proposal for the federal
budget and elegantly internalizes the offsetting savings that employers and
employees would enjoy by moving into the Medicare systems in this manner. We
also offer in this section a brief analysis of why this kind of reform might be possible
though a budget reconciliation bill that would only require a simple Senate majority.

I.

BACKGROUND ON U.S. HEALTHCARE FINANCE AND
LEADING REFORM PROPOSALS

The United States is unique among nations when it comes to paying for health
care, and not in a good way. Most OECD countries’ systems for health care
financing grew up in the early- to mid-20th century as medical care became more
advanced and expensive. 20 In Europe, what emerged were public systems of health
care finance in two forms, often characterized coarsely as Beveridge and Bismarkian
systems. 21 The Beveridge approach was direct provision of health care by the
government, as in England, where the government owns hospitals and employs
medical professionals—aka “socialized medicine.” In Bismarkian systems, or social
insurance, the government finances health care but the providers can be public or
private. This is what traditional Medicare is in the United States. Even as countries
developed variations on these themes, at their core, these systems embraced the idea
that the government would take a central role in ensuring access to affordable health
care for the entire population.
The U.S. charted a wholly different path, leading with private health insurance
and facilitated by hospitals. As medical care became both more effective and
expensive, hospitals feared unpaid bills if they relied on patients to pay cash for
service, or having to confirm the financial solvency of every patient prior to
providing care. 22 In response, first hospitals and later cities created pre-paid health
care funds, such as the one established by Baylor University Hospital in the 1920s,
which guaranteed people access to medical care up to a certain level, with prepayment. 23 These types of hospital service plans spread and eventually evolved into
Blue Cross. Within a short period, Blue Shield followed, offering a similar a

PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 237-240 (1982).
T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA, Ch. 2 (2009).
22
STARR, supra note 20, at 295-96.
23
Id. at 297-298.
20
21
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structure for monthly prepayment of fees to groups of physicians in turn for
guaranteed access of outpatient care. 24
Then, in the mid 20th Century, employers grew as a source of health coverage in
the U.S., coinciding with the moment that many other countries were doubling down
on the government’s role. 25 In the U.S., several public policies fostered the growth
of employer-based coverage. A commonly-told story is that the trend is due to wage
controls during the war, prompting employers to compensate with benefits instead
of cash wages, but the growth in employer health plans was relatively small in this
period as compared to the years prior and after the war. 26 More consistent with the
timing of a major upsurge in adoption of ESI were a 1945 federal rule that required
employers to leave wartime health benefits in place, a 1949 federal rule allowing
unions to bargain collectively for health benefits, and most importantly a 1954 rule
by the Internal Revenue Service excluding dollars spent on health benefits by
employers and employees from taxation.27 Because of this tax exemption, employerprovided health benefits are worth substantially more on an after-tax basis than an
equivalent amount of cash compensation, creating a strong incentive for employers
to offer such benefits. With all of these factors, ESI and the centrality of private
insurance took hold.
The tax benefits associated with ESI continue to be an important driver of its
primacy today, but other factors also contribute.28 Before the ACA, markets for
individually-purchased health insurance functioned poorly, allowing employers to
offer their employees a benefit they could not get elsewhere. Large employers also
benefit from natural risk pooling and economies of scale that make their
administrative costs lower than either individual or small group coverage (although
still higher than Medicare). 29
While the ACA significantly improved the availability and affordability of
coverage on the individual market, ESI has continued to be the dominant source of
private coverage. Today, nearly 60% of all nonelderly Americans have insurance
through an employer, 30 with Medicare providing the primary source of coverage for
the elderly and individuals with disabilities and Medicaid providing the primary
source of coverage for certain low-income and medically needy individuals. Across
24
Id. Unlike the private health insurance of today, the Blues embraced some of the solidaristic characteristics
that define systems elsewhere in the world, like charging all members of a community the same rate for membership
regardless of their personal characteristics or health status.
25
In England, for example, during WWII the government built health infrastructure to deal with an unmet
need for medical services and this infrastructure served as the beginning of the National Health Service, established
at the end of the war. Donald W. Light, Universal Health Care: Lessons From the British Experience, 93 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 25, 26 (2003).
26
David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—Origins and Implications,
355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 83 (2006).
27
Id. at 83: see also Jost, supra note 7.
28
For an overview of the many advantages of ESI, see David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for
Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 23 (2001).
29
See text accompanying notes 75-77, infra.
30
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/totalpopulation/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%
7D (data reported as of 2019).
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the entire U.S population, 49.6% are covered by ESI, 5.9% by private individual
market coverage, 19.8% by Medicaid, 14.2% by Medicare, and 1.4% through
military coverage, with 9.2% remaining uninsured. 31
Hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of proposals have promised to reform the
dysfunctional health care financing system in the U.S. Many of these, dating back
decades, have questioned whether employers should continue to play a fundamental
role in health coverage. 32 We focus below on the two that have been most prominent
in recent years – Medicare for All and an individual public option, the first of which
abolishes the employer-based system and the latter of which leaves the employerbased system untouched. Because we believe that an employer public option
provides an attractive path forward that avoids either extreme, we conclude this Part
by focusing on the underappreciated challenges of employer-provided coverage and
why what is often considered to be the highest-functioning piece of the U.S. health
care system might be the best place to begin systemic reform.

A. Medicare for All
Since its passage in 1965, some believed Medicare would eventually become
the health insurance program for all Americans. 33 Momentum in this direction
slowed right away with the simultaneous passage of Medicaid, a program that paid
for the most vulnerable populations—children and pregnant women—and took the
wind out of the sails of quick additional reforms that might have built on Medicare. 34
Yet, the idea of building on Medicare has reemerged after a period of dormancy
and in various forms. With Senator Bernie Sanders in 2016 and a longer bench of
proponents in the 2020 Democratic primaries, including Senators Elizabeth Warren
and Kamala Harris—the idea of Medicare for All (MFA) gained momentum. Most
proposals lacked concrete details, but the basic idea was similar. Candidates argued
to replace the dysfunctional way that we pay for medical care in the United States
with a more efficient and equitable model available to all, or most, people.
Senator Bernie Sanders advanced the “purest” version of this idea, a singlepayer public health insurance program that would cover everyone with automatic
enrollment. He introduced the plan as a Senate bill 35 and as the basis of his health
policy in his candidacy in the 2016 and 2020 Democratic primaries. 36 Following the

31

Id.
See, e.g. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK vii
(Marilyn J. Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds, 1993) (“Unlike most National Research Council committees, however,
this committee did not reach consensus on some central issues. For example, committee members could not agree
on whether employment-based health benefits should be continued or abandoned …”).
33
THEODORE R. MARMOR, POLITICS OF MEDICARE 173 (2d ed., 2000).
34
Id. at 60.
35
For most recent version, see Medicare for All Act of 2019, S.1129, 116th Cong., at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senatebill/1129/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22medicare+for+all%5C%22%22%5D%7D&r=2&s=
4. The 2019 House version was sponsored by Representative Pramila Jayapal. Medicare for All Act of 2019,
H.R.1384, 116th Cong., at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1384.
36
Bernie Sanders on Healthcare, FEELTHEBERN.ORG, https://feelthebern.org/bernie-sanders-on-healthcare/
[https://perma.cc/TGZ9-QPBV], last visited Mar. 5, 2020 (stating Medicare for all “[c]overs primary and preventive
32
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2016, election, more politicians began to follow in Senator Sanders’s footsteps. The
Medicare for All Act of 2019 included fourteen co-sponsors, including prominent
members such as Senators Harris, Leahy, Markey, and Warren.37 Notable about
Senator Sander’s version of Medicare for All are its ideological commitments and
truly universal and comprehensive nature, which for many made it more symbolic
than realistic. 38 This proposal came with a hefty price tag – with estimates from think
tanks or academics ranging from about $25 trillion to $35 trillion in increased federal
government costs or outlays over the ten-year period following a Medicare for All
enactment. 39 Yet, many experts estimated that this plan that would leave no one
uninsured or underinsured would result in little or no growth in total health care
spending. 40
As discussed further in Part III, because the federal government would pay a
large part of the price tag through taxes, the fiscal case proved a major stumbling
block. Sanders proposed a variety of mechanisms for progressive financing,
including increased taxes that also provided his opponents fodder for attack. 41
Notably, several candidates espoused the idea on the 2020 campaign trail
during the Democratic primaries. One of the more intriguing policy aspects of these
proposals arose when some candidates, including Senators Sanders, Warren, and
Harris, introduced “phase-in” plans on how to transition from the current system to
MFA. 42 Perhaps most relevant now are the details—albeit few—of Senator Harris’s
plan.
After strong advocacy for MFA, Senator Harris pulled back slightly and
acknowledged, rightly, that it is difficult to get from a deeply-embedded employerbased health insurance system to Medicare for All. Thus, she proposed a ten-year
transition period, during which people who wanted to buy into Medicare more
quickly could do so. 43 Harris’s transition period included some structural
care, mental health care, reproductive care, vision, hearing and dental care, and prescription drugs, as well as longterm services for the disabled and elderly.”).
37
Medicare for All Act of 2019, S.1129, 116th Cong., at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senatebill/1129/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22medicare+for+all%5C%22%22%5D%7D&r=2&s=
4.
38
These commitments included universal coverage; a short four-year transition period after which every
American would be automatically enrolled; comprehensive benefits that reached well beyond what Medicare covers
today, including dental and vision benefits, and long-term care; and no cost-sharing at the point of care, erasing the
deductibles, co-payments, co-insurance, and balance billing that vex and financially strain many Americans. Id.
39
Choices for Financing Medicare for All, COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET,
http://www.crfb.org/papers/choices-financing-medicare-all (last visited June 12, 2020).
40
See, e.g., Josh Katz et al., Would ‘Medicare for All’ Save Billions or Cost Billions?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2019.
41
How Does Bernie Pay for His Major Plans?, BernieSanders.com, https://berniesanders.com/issues/howdoes-bernie-pay-his-major-plans/ [https://perma.cc/J4BW-ZPX8] (last visited Dec. 23, 2020).
42
Elizabeth Warren, My First Term Plan for Reducing Health Care Costs in America and Transitioning to
Medicare
for
All,
ELIZABETHWARREN.COM,
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/m4a-transition
[https://perma.cc/L3LW-W4JJ] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020) (detailing Warren’s plan for transitioning to Medicare
for All, which included immediate and free coverage for children under age 18 and anyone earning under 200% of
the federal poverty level).
43
Kamala Harris, My Plan for Medicare for All, MEDIUM (July 29, 2019),
https://medium.com/@KamalaHarris/my-plan-for-medicare-for-all-7730370dd421
[https://perma.cc/82EXQ84G]. The Sanders’s and Warren transition plans also allowed this individual opt-in.
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characteristics to lubricate more fundamental long-term transformation, including
automatically enrolling all newborns and uninsured people into the Medicare
program. 44 Senator Harris stood by the eventual goal of MFA: “At the end of the
ten-year transition, every American will be a part of this new Medicare system.” 45
Although what we propose in this Article differs from Senator Harris’s
transition plan, both recognize that a key to fundamental and necessary change is a
more gradual shift away from our over reliance on employers as a locus of access to
health insurance.

B. Fixing the ACA with an Individual Public Option
The public option has been described by its proponents as simply one option
among many, a public health insurance plan that would compete side-by-side with
private plans. Presumably, if the public option offered a similar or better product for
lower prices, people would choose it. As Jacob Hacker suggested: “public plan
choice gives Americans the opportunity to choose for themselves how they value
the strengths and weaknesses of a public, Medicare-based plan and competing
private health plans.” 46
Provoking some of the most heated moments in the primaries were debates
between the MFA advocates and those candidates who preferred to build
incrementally on the ACA with a public option. Most, including Vice President Joe
Biden, still leaned on Medicare for their plans, but only to serve as the foundation
for the public option to fill in the gaps the ACA left. Dozens of Congressional
proposals envision a similar model.
What most defines the prominent public options plans is who makes the
selection of the plan—the individual. These plans are built on individual choice and
are sold as the epitome of autonomy, as Pete Buttigieg promoted it on the campaign
trail: “Medicare for all Who Want It.” 47 Although the policy details have evolved
from the initial conversations that took place prior to the passage of the ACA, the
main contours remain and are similar among different plans. The public option is
based on Medicare and is offered in the ACA exchanges, or marketplaces, where an
individual, or in some cases a small business, could select it.
The Sanders-Biden Unity Task Force recommendations, which align fairly
closely with what Vice President Biden proposed on the campaign trail, wrote:
Private insurers need real competition to ensure they have
incentive to provide affordable, quality coverage to every American.
To achieve that objective, we will give all Americans the choice
to select a high-quality, affordable public option through the
Affordable Care Act marketplace. The public option will provide at
least one plan choice without deductibles, will be administered by
44

Id.
Id.
46
Jacob S. Hacker, Institute for America’s Future, The Case for Public Plan Choice in National Health Reform
2 (2008).
47
See Dylan Scott, Pete Buttigieg’s Medicare-for-all-who-want-it plan, explained, Vox.com (Sept. 19, 2019),
at https://www.vox.com/2019/9/19/20872881/pete-buttigieg-2020-medicare-for-all (last accessed Feb. 15, 2021),
45
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the traditional Medicare program, not private companies, and will
cover all primary care without any copayments and control costs for
other treatments by negotiating prices with doctors and hospitals,
just like Medicare does on behalf of older people. The lowestincome Americans not eligible for Medicaid will be automatically
enrolled in the public option at no cost to them, although they may
choose to opt out at any time. Everyone will be eligible to choose
the public option or another Affordable Care Act marketplace plan,
even those who currently get insurance through their employers,
because Democrats believe working people shouldn’t be locked in
to [sic.] expensive or insufficient health care plans when better
options are available. 48
This idea would improve the status quo. It would fill gaps left by the ACA,
especially in those states that have chosen not to expand Medicaid, which perversely
left some of the poorest people in the states uninsured when others earning just
pennies more receive generous subsidies to buy private plans. Plus, in states where
there are very few private insurers participating on the exchanges, there is evidence
that a public option might help keep premium prices in check. 49 Various pieces of
proposed legislation have included a similar public option, including eight of ten
health reform bills proposed in Congress last session. 50
Yet, the problem with these proposals is that they will almost certainly fail to
catalyze more fundamental change. It is unlikely that this public option—even in the
best-case scenario—will reach very many people. As of now, only six percent of the
non-elderly population (just under 20 million people) have individual market
coverage. 51 If every uninsured person were added to this market, it would grow to
just under 50 million people. 52 By comparison, there are an estimated 156.5 million
individuals with employment-based coverage, 53 and a further 26 million employees
Press Release, JoeBiden.com, Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations 28 (Aug. 2020), at
https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf.
49
See Jon R. Gabel et al., Competition and Premium Costs in Single-Insurer Marketplaces: A Study of Five
COMMONWEALTH
FUND,
(Mar.
6,
2018),
Rural
States,
THE
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2018/mar/competition-and-premium-costs-singleinsurer-marketplaces-study (showing that decreases in number of insurers in some states marketplaces led to
relatively faster premium growth).
50
Choose Medicare Act, S. 1261, H.R. 2463, 116th Cong. (2019); Medicare for America, H.R. 2452, 116th
Cong. (2019); Medicare-X Choice Act of 2017, S.1970, 115th Cong. (2017); The CHOICE Act, H.R.2085, S.1033,
116th Cong. (2019) (sponsored by Representative Schakowsky and Senator Whitehouse to create a federal public
plan option on the ACA marketplaces under existing procedures and rules); Keeping Health Insurance Affordable
Act, S.3, 116th Cong. (2019) (sponsored by Senator Cardin to create a federal public option on ACA exchanges);
Medicare at 50 Act, S.470, 116th Cong. (2019) (sponsored by Senator Debbie Stabenow and allows individual age
50 and older to opt into Medicare early); Medicare Buy-In and Health Care Stabilization Act of 2019, H.R.1346,
116th Cong. (2019) (sponsored by Representative Higgins to allow individuals age 50 and older to opt into
Medicare); State Public Option Act, S.489, H.R.1277, 116th Cong. (2019) (co-sponsored by Senator Schatz and
Representative Lujan to allow a state public option for Medicaid buy in).
5151
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 30.
52
Id.
53
Matthew Rae, Daniel McDermot, et al., Long-Term Trends in Employer-Based Coverage, PETERSON-KFF,
HEALTH SYSTEM TRACKER.
(Apr. 3, 2020) https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/long-term-trends-in-employer-based-coverage/.
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who either are not offered coverage by their own firms or are offered and decline
coverage. Even more, these proposals all rely on individuals identifying that the
public option is better for them than the private plans offered in their state and
selecting it. A mountain of evidence makes clear that individuals struggle to figure
out what health plan is best for them and are resistant to change plans once they
select them. 54 Even those who understand health insurance well struggle to
differentiate and select among health plans, which should be unsurprising when
considering the nature of health plan choice. At the most fundamental level, buying
health insurance demands having preferences about things that most people have
never experienced before, like hospitalization or cancer care, and weigh the risk of
ever needing such care against spending on other goods and services.
Most people do not understand the basic features of health insurance plans that
should shape their decisions—such as how much a plan costs, cost-sharing features,
and what benefits are covered. 55
Furthermore, choosing a health plan requires making calculations regarding
deductibles, cost-sharing, and premiums that exceed many American’s literacy and
numeracy skills. 56 In the end, there is a volume of empirical work illuminating the
many ways that and reasons why individuals—regardless of education, income, or
smarts—make poor choices among health plans. 57
54
See Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1926, 1953-58 (2019)
(citing studies showing the many ways in which people make poor health insurance choices, and why); Allison K.
Hoffman, The ACA’s Choice Problem, 45 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 501, 504-506 (2020) (describing a selection
of these studies).
55
Deborah W. Garnick et al., How Well Do Americans Understand their Health Coverage, 12 HEALTH AFF.
204, 206 (1993) (finding that even though consumers largely understood whether their plans covered hospitalization
or doctors’ visits, they underreported that their plans covered services including mental health, alcohol and drug
abuse treatment, or prescription drug and over-reported that their plans covered long-term care). George
Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insurance, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 850, 855 (2013) (In a
survey of insured adults, only 14 percent correctly answered four simple multiple-choice questions about costsharing features like a deductible or copayment.)
56
Wendy Nelson et al., Clinical Implications of Numeracy: Theory and Practice, 35 ANN. BEHAV. MED. 261
(2008) (providing an overview of research on health numeracy and the clinical implications for patients); Ellen
Peters & Irwin P. Levin, Dissecting the Risky-Choice Framing Effect: Numeracy as an Individual-Difference Factor
in Weighing Risky and Riskless Options, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 435 (2008) (showing that lower levels
of numeracy led to higher loss aversion). On health insurance literacy specifically, see, e.g., ZSOFIA PARRAGH &
DEANNA OKRENT, HEALTH LITERACY AND HEALTH INSURANCE LITERACY: DO CONSUMERS KNOW WHAT THEY
ARE BUYING (Alliance for Health Reform, Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.allhealthpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/Health-Literacy-Toolkit_163.pdf (describing and summarizing studies on health insurance
literacy).
57
The many studies showing these problems span different insurance marketplaces that have plan choices,
including employer, ACA, and Medicare Part D. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable
Care Affordable? The Value of Choice Architecture, 8 PLOS ONE e81521. (showing in a simulated ACA model
even odds that participants who passed a screening test for basic insurance literacy would select the better plan, and
Wharton business school study participants got it wrong over one-quarter of the time); Anna D. Sinaiko & Richard
A. Hirth, Consumers, Health Insurance, and Dominated Choices, 30 J. HEALTH ECON 450, 453 (2011) (showing
among enrollees in the University of Michigan’s employee health plan, over one-third of workers selected a plan
that was identical to another in every way except that it had a more restricted provider network, a plan known as a
“dominated” plan because no one should choose such a plan in any circumstance); Jason Abaluck & Jonathan
Gruber, Heterogeneity in Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: Evidence from Prescription Drug Plan Choice,
101 AM. ECON. REV. 377, 379 (2011) (finding that 73 percent of Medicare Part D prescription drug program
enrollees could have chosen a plan with lower premiums with no risk of spending more on prescription drugs over
the course of the year.); Florian Heiss et al., Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from Administrative Data,
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The bottom line is that public option proposals focused on the individual market
are unlikely to provide an incremental step towards more coherent and equitable
health care financing. Competition in the individual health insurance market simply
does not work as intended or predicted. Even if the public option were an obvious
best alternative offered on the individual market, individuals would not necessarily
select it. In turn, the public option would not exert competitive market pressure that
some still predict and hope it might. That means that even if the public option were
widely taken up by currently uninsured individuals, it would reach only a small
subset of the population, while leaving the larger inequitable and confusing
patchwork in place.

C. Employer-Sponsored Coverage as an Attractive Starting Point
for Reform
As discussed above, employers currently play a central role in providing health
insurance, which at first blush makes targeting a public option and reforms at ESI
seem potentially fraught. It is one of the more stable aspects of a healthcare financing
system that has many more critical gaps to fix, including the fact that approximately
ten percent of the population under age sixty-five is still uninsured. 58 Yet the
fragmented employer-based system acts as a real impediment to any type of
fundamental change to our system of healthcare finance. Without beginning to rethink employer-provided coverage, it is hard to imagine tackling fundamental issues
such as cost containment and the provision of universal and equitable coverage.
There are of course several reasons why employers might prefer to remain at the
center of the U.S. healthcare system. Large employers generally view health benefits
as an important part of their strategy to recruit and retain workers, a position that is
generally supported by employee surveys. 59 Some employers see keeping
employees healthy as enhancing productivity and use health benefits to try to
maintain a healthy workforce, including wellness programs, gym membership, and
health coaching for chronic or serious conditions. 60 These factors make the current
32 J. HEALTH ECON 1325, 1377-78 (2013) (estimating that only about 10 percent of Medicare Part D enrollees
choose the least-expensive plan option); Vicki Fung et al., Nearly One-Third of Enrollees in California’s Individual
Market Missed Opportunities to Receive Financial Assistance, 36 HEALTH AFF. 21 (2017) (describing that a
significant share of ACA enrollees choose plans with the lowest monthly premiums but that make them ineligible
for cost-sharing reductions to help pay for out-of-pocket costs, likely leading to more spending over the year for
many of them). When measured more subjectively, people fail to buy plans that align with their own stated
preferences or needs. See, e.g., Saurabh Bhargava et al., The Costs of Poor Health (Plan Choices) & Prescriptions
for Reform, 3 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & POL’Y 1, 7-8, 10 (2017) (simulating purchase on ACA exchanges, only one-third
of respondents chose the cost-minimizing plan, based on their own anticipated medical care need) The authors of
this study estimated that if all people buying plans on the ACA exchanges had similar error rates as the study
population, “the result would be roughly $7.1 billion of excess spending each year, borne by a population with low
to moderate incomes.” Id. at 10.
58
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 30.
59
See, e.g., America’s Health Insurance Plans, The Value of Employer-Provided Coverage (2018) (reporting
results of employee survey where 71% reported satisfaction with their employer’s health plan. Forty-six percent of
surveyed employees stated that their employer’s health plan played a role in recruiting them, and 56% reported that
the health plan has an impact on the employee’s choice to stay in their current job).
60
See Jeffrey Pfeffer et al., Employers’ Role in Employee Health: Why They Do What They Do, 62 J.
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. e601 (2020). But see Damon Jones et al., What do Workplace Wellness Programs
do? Evidence from the Illinois Workplace Wellness Study, 134 Q.J. ECON 1747 (2019) (presenting the results of a
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structure sticky, but not unyielding to change, as we explore in Part II.C addressing
the many reasons why employers might want change. First, this subpart offers a
quick landscape of the employer market and its challenges to illuminate why we
think targeting a public option at that market is necessary.
1. The Evolving Picture of the Employer Market and Growing Costs
An estimated 156.5 million nonelderly individuals were enrolled in an employer
plan in 2018 (58% of the nonelderly population and 49% of the total U.S.
population). 61 Just over half of all private sector firms offer health insurance to some
workers, but nearly all firms with more than 200 workers do so. 62 Seventy percent
of workers covered by health insurance are employed at large firms. 63 This is why
we think that large employers are a necessary locus for more fundamental, structural
change.
Larger firms are more likely to offer better health insurance and to require
employees to pay a lower share of costs, as compared to smaller firms. Large firm
plans tend to have higher total premiums, due to the generosity of benefits, but lower
employee premium contributions, lower deductibles, lower out-of-pocket
maximums, and lower copays. 64
Yet, regardless of size of firm, the cost of health benefits for employers has
skyrocketed over the past two decades, far outpacing wage growth and inflation. 65
The average annual premiums in 2020 were $7,470 for single coverage and $21,342
for family coverage. 66 Employers have been paying more for coverage, with the
average employer contribution increasing from $1,878 in 1999 to $6,227 in 2020 for
single coverage and $4,247 to $15,754 for family coverage. 67 Employee
contributions have also increased substantially, with required contributions for
family coverage increasing 13% over the last five years and 40% over the last ten
years. 68 Today, employees are required to contribute on average 17% of the premium
for single coverage and 27% of the premium for family coverage. 69 Not surprisingly,
firms with lower-wage workers have less generous benefits and greater worker
contributions; for family coverage, these firms had an average family premium of
$19,332 in 2020, with workers contributions of $7,226 (close to 40%). In addition
to premiums, cost-sharing obligations are also considerable. In 2020, over half of all
randomized controlled trial of a workplace wellness program, which found that such programs neither lower medical
costs nor improve health outcomes or worker productivity).
61
Matthew Rae, Daniel McDermot, et al., Long-Term Trends in Employer-Based Coverage, PETERSON-KFF,
HEALTH SYSTEM TRACKER
(Apr. 3, 2020) https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/long-term-trends-in-employer-based-coverage/.
62
KFF Employer Health Benefits 2020, supra note 13, at 45.
63
Id. at 25, Figure M.6.
64
Id at 41,
65
Id. at 40, 42. Figure 1.10, Figure 1.12.
66
Id. at 7.
67
Id. at 83-84.
68
Id. at 96.
69
Id. at 82. Rates of employer subsidization vary based on firm size, particularly for family coverage. Large
firms require employees to pay on average 24% of the cost of family coverage, while small firms require employees
to pay 35% of the cost. Id.
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covered workers were in plans with an average annual deductible of over $1000. 70
When premiums and cost-sharing obligations are combined, employees on average
pay 34% of total healthcare costs (20% premiums, 13% all other costs). 71
Although most large employer plans offer a reasonable choice of providers, the
breadth of choice has diminished over time as employers try to contain costs, 72 and
will almost certainly continue to do so over time since limiting networks is the most
feasible cost control mechanism under employers’ control. Changes to benefits will
be more likely to garner objections from employees. Large firm plans generally offer
several options of plans but they have only small differences among them with
respect to the treatments and services covered. 73 And employer plans have little
control over the prices they for items and services, as discussed below. As a result,
most ESI plans have some limits in the network of providers someone can see, or
charge more for seeing doctors out of network. 74
The overhead costs for plans vary significantly, although are difficult to estimate
precisely because of the inconsistent and malleable ways that both private and public
plans categorize various costs. One study reported that administrative expenses for
small group health plans accounts for 25-27% of premiums, compared to 5-11% for
large companies with self-insured health plans. 75 Another found that administrative
expenses average 17% for private insurers. 76 In each case, the estimates for
employer-provided plans tend to be higher than the 2-5% administrative overhead
for Medicare and Medicaid. 77 And it is not clear whether these estimates sufficiently
account for the in-house resources devoted to health plan administration, as
discussed below.
2. The Administrative Costs and Challenges of Employer-Provided
Health Coverage
In addition to the significant premium expense of employer-provided health
plans, there are also less obvious costs and risks associated with such coverage from
Id. at 104.
Matthew Rae, Rebecca Copeland & Cynthia Cox, Tracking the Rise in Premium Contributions and CostSharing for Families With Large Employer Coverage, PETERSON-KFF: HEALTH SYSTEM TRACKER (Aug. 14, 2019)
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/tracking-the-rise-in-premium-contributions-and-cost-sharing-forfamilies-with-large-employer-coverage/. As for prescription drug costs, the same report found that large employers
end up paying 88.9% of the cost. Id.
72
KFF Employer Health Benefits 2020, supra note 13, at 78, Fig. 5.1.
73
DEP’T OF LABOR, SELECTED MEDICAL BENEFITS: A REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR TO THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
SERVICES
5-36
(2011),
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/selmedbensreport.pdf 5-36.
74
Id. at 77. Forty-seven percent of workers are in PPOs; 31% in HDHP/SOs; 13% in HMOs; 8% in POS plans;
and 1% in conventional plans. The POS and conventional plans might compete on network, but all others have more
network restrictions than Medicare does. Of firms with 5000 workers or more, the largest plan for 31% has a tiered
provider network.
75
A self-insured plan is one in which the employer retains responsibility for paying claims, often utilizing an
insurance company only to provide administrative services.
76
Emily Gee & Topher Spiro, Excess Administrative Costs Burden the U.S. Health Care System, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN
PROGRESS
(Apr.
8,
2019),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2019/04/08/468302/excess-administrative-costsburden-u-s-health-care-system/.
77
Id.
70
71
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the employer’s perspective. In particular, offering a group health plan comes with
significant plan design costs and challenges, compliance costs, and litigation risks.
It is likely that at least some employers have become accustomed to these obligations
and now have come to consider them among the costs of doing business. Yet, if
offered the opportunity to relinquish them, we think many would do so gladly.
An employer that decides to offer a health plan to employees must begin by
making various plan design decisions, such as eligibility terms, benefit design, costsharing structure, network breadth, and financing arrangement. For large employers,
in-house benefits experts typically work with outside benefits consultants to make
these decisions, while smaller employers may consult only an insurance broker.
Once these initial decisions are made, the employer must either purchase a group
insurance policy or hire a third-party administrator (TPA) to administer the plan.
That purchasing or hiring process is typically done through a request for proposals
(“RFP”) that solicits bids from interested parties. In fact, it is not unusual for a large
employer to issue multiple RFPs to cover not only traditional medical benefits, but
also separate RFPs for the plan’s prescription drug benefit, specialty drug benefit,
wellness program, COBRA administration, and data warehousing. Once bids are
received, the employer must select a winner in each category and negotiate the final
terms of the contracts.
If the employer wants to allow employees to pay for premiums on a pre-tax basis
(as all should), the employer must establish a cafeteria plan under section 125 of the
Internal Revenue Code to allow such contributions. Many employers also choose to
offer a health care flexible spending account under their cafeteria plan, which allows
employees to pay out-of-pocket medical expenses on a pre-tax basis, which typically
requires yet another vendor.
After the plan has been designed and agreements with vendors are in place, the
employer must administer an open enrollment process, informing eligible employees
of their choices and allowing them to make an election within a specified window.
Plus, they must establish technical processes to actually enroll the employee and
family members in coverage and ensure the proper payroll deductions and plan
contributions are made.
Following open enrollment, the plan must be administered on an ongoing basis.
While the insurer or a third-party administrator is principally responsible for such
administration, the tasks involved are significant. At a minimum, the insurer or TPA
must process prior authorization requests, claims and appeals, and mid-year changes
in enrollment. The insurer or TPA is also responsible for negotiating and
maintaining a provider network and, as a practical matter, must have a call center
for both participant and provider inquiries.
a. Regulatory Burdens
Once the plan is up and running, employers are faced with myriad legal
requirements. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended
(ERISA) is the federal statute that governs nearly all employer-provided health
plans, other than those sponsored by churches or governments. Although ERISA
was designed primarily with pension plans in mind, it imposes significant reporting
and disclosure and claims and appeals procedures on health plans. ERISA also
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incorporates federal requirements that provide the right for individuals covered by
an employer health plan to continue their coverage for a specific period of time if
they have a qualifying loss of coverage (known as “COBRA” continuation
coverage), as well as various nondiscrimination requirements included in the Health
Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA) and a small number of
mandated benefits. 78
In addition to ERISA, the federal tax code also regulates employer-provided
health plans. The tax code contains the so-called employer mandate, which subjects
large employers to a financial penalty if they fail to offer an affordable group health
plan. 79 The calculation of the credit is complicated, but it generally ranges from
$2,000 to $3,000 per employee per year. There are regulations establishing when an
employer is considered to offer a group health plan for these purposes, and when
and to what extent that coverage is considered affordable for a particular employee.80
The tax code also incorporates many of ERISA’s substantive group health plan
requirements and the ACA’s health insurance reforms (such as prohibitions on preexisting condition exclusions and lifetime and annual limits) and subjects plans that
do not comply with such requirements to a $100 per day per affected individual
excise tax. 81 In addition, as mentioned above, in order to allow participants to pay
premiums on a pre-tax basis, the employer must adopt a cafeteria plan administered
in accordance with IRS guidance. For example, the cafeteria plan regulations dictate
when a married employee who is getting a divorce may change their health plan
election from family coverage to single employee coverage, or drop or add coverage
altogether. Similarly detailed rules apply to health care flexible spending accounts,
which may only be offered through a cafeteria plan.
Employers must also ensure compliance with several other federal laws that
touch employer health plans, such as HIPAA’s privacy rules, the Americans with
Disability Act (ADA), and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). For employees
who are Medicare-eligible, the employer or plan administrator must navigate
Medicare Secondary Payer rules, which determine how benefit payments are
coordinated between the employer plan and Medicare.
Some employer plans, if financed through an insurance contract rather than selfinsured, are also subject to state laws. Such laws regulate not only the insurance
company itself (through mechanisms such as capital reserve requirements), but can
also have an impact on substantive features of the group contract, such as mandated
benefits or dispute resolution mechanisms. For plans that self-insure but purchase
stop loss coverage, state law can regulate the stop loss policy.

ERISA broadly preempts state laws that relate to employee benefit plans, other than those that regulate
insurance, which creates an additional level of legal complexity that often results in litigation over what state laws
are preempted and has produced an encyclopedic number of Supreme Court decisions. See 29 U.S.C. §1144(a).
79
I.R.C. §4980H.
80
Treas. Reg. §54.4980H-5. See also David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of
Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income
Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669 (2012) (detailing some of the labor market distortions that are likely to result from
the ACA’s tax provisions).
81
I.R.C. § 4980D.
78
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b. Claims Disputes and Litigation Risks
In addition to the upfront plan design costs and ongoing compliance costs,
employers that sponsor a group health plan also face risks related to claims disputes.
Where a health plan denies a claim, the covered individual has the right to an internal
appeal that is subject to detailed procedural requirements. In addition, as part of
ACA reforms, nearly all employer plans now must offer participants the ability to
appeal claims that are denied on the basis of clinical or scientific judgment to an
independent medical expert. That independent review is conducted de novo, and is
binding on the plan. If those appeals are unsuccessful, the covered individual has
the right to file suit under ERISA to challenge the claim denial.82
While the financial impact of these claims disputes may be relatively limited, 83
these lawsuits can have a profound impact on the relationship between employer and
employee. A dispute between an employer and employee about potentially life or
death issues can irreparably harm the employment relationship with the affected
employee and also damage morale within the broader employee community.
In addition to lawsuits brought by employees, employers that sponsor health
plans sometimes find themselves as plaintiffs in lawsuits against employees to
enforce plan reimbursement clauses. These clauses, common in employer health
plans, require that covered individuals reimburse the plan for medical expenses if
the plan paid for medical care and the employee later recovers against a third party
in an action related to those medical expenses. For example, if an employee is
injured in a car accident and receives a related settlement or judgment from a thirdparty, the health plan has a right to be reimbursed for the amount it spent to provide
medical care to the employee as a result of the car accident. As with denied claims
lawsuits, these reimbursement actions often damage the employer-employee
relationship and have at times resulted in unfavorable media coverage of the
employer. 84
All told, designing and maintaining a group health plan is a significant and costly
undertaking for large employers, over and above actual premium costs. While those
efforts generally deliver a valued benefit, a public option that provides high value
coverage without these burdens could prove very attractive to both employers and
employees.

While claims that proceed to litigation pose relatively low financial risk, independent external review carries
greater risk for a plan. In litigation, a court reviews a plan’s decision under the highly deferential “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review. In external review, a qualified expert reviews the claim de novo, but only claims
that involve the exercise of clinical or scientific judgment are eligible for external review.
83
Punitive and extra-contractual damages are unavailable under ERISA which limits recoveries in successful
appeals of benefit denials to the cost of the service at issue and plaintiff’s attorneys fees.
84
See, e.g., Andrew Clark, Wal-Mart Drops Bid to Sue Brain-Damaged Former Shelf-Stacker, THE
GUARDIAN, April 2, 2008; Tara Parker-Pope, Injured Woman Wins Wal-Mart Saga, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 2008;
Andrew Wolfson, Walmart Changed Policy After Claiming an Injured Worker’s Settlement Became a PR
Nightmare, LOUISVILLE COURIER JOURNAL, April 5, 2018.
82
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II. OUR PROPOSAL: AN EMPLOYER PUBLIC HEALTH
INSURANCE OPTION

We believe there is a better way forward than either Medicare for All or an
individual public option. We propose a public option for employers, which would
give employers a voluntary choice to offer Medicare-based public insurance
coverage in lieu of traditional group coverage. We begin by making the basic case
for an employer public option and then review key design features in detail. We
conclude by examining the likelihood that the proposal would gain traction among
employers and other stakeholders.

A. The Basic Case for an Employer Public Option
If the ultimate goal of health care reform is to move toward universal and
equitable coverage, we believe that providing employers with the ability to offer
employees coverage through a Medicare-based public insurance program presents a
meaningful and politically viable opportunity for reform. Specifically, an employer
public option offers a path toward systemic reform, as well as direct benefits for both
employers and employees, and it sheds the primary downsides of the two most
prominent reform proposals. Unlike Medicare for All, a public option for employers
would not force a shift to public coverage, yet it would have far more impact than
an individual public option. Importantly, for those that favor Medicare for All as a
long-term strategy, an employer public option would provide a potential transition
to that end point. And an employer public option could be offered alongside an
individual public option without harm to either strategy.
1. The Ability to Achieve Systemic Change
a. Price Control and Provider Networks
An employer public option provides a mechanism to decrease the cost of care
and its administrative expenses, increase the number of individuals with health
insurance coverage, and deliver subsidies to low- and moderate-income individuals.
A key feature of an employer public option and its ability to bring about systemic
change is the ability of the government to negotiate down prices. Medicare prices
are on average one-half that of private health insurance plans.85 Over the past
decade, Medicare has controlled per enrollee spending much better than private
health insurance.86 Health spending growth has far outpaced growth of the economy,
growing from just under seven percent of GDP in 1970 to nearly twenty percent
now. 87 Even over the last decade, from 2008-2019, during a period when the rate of
spending has slowed, private health insurance cumulative growth in per enrollee

85
Eric Lopez et al., Kaiser Family Foundation, How Much More Than Medicare Do Private Insurers Pay? A
Review of the Literature (Apr. 15, 2020), at https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/how-much-more-thanmedicare-do-private-insurers-pay-a-review-of-the-literature/ (last accessed Feb. 15, 2020).
86
Rabah Kamal et al., How has U.S. spending on healthcare changed over time?, PETERSON-KFF: HEALTH
SYSTEM TRACKER (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/u-s-spending-healthcarechanged-time/#item-start.
87
Id.
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spending is over fifty percent, as compared to half that rate (just over twenty-six
percent) for Medicare. 88
During this same period, health care providers—including hospitals and
physicians—have merged and become increasingly consolidated. 89 As a result, in
many areas of the country providers have been able to demand higher prices for care
with little effective resistance from private insurers and employers against these
demands. 90Even when Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, and JPMorgan Chase joined
together to attempt wield their collective power to improve employer-provided
health care, they found that they lacked the market power to successfully negotiate
prices down. 91 Large insurers might in some cases be able to push back on providers
in market-based negotiations, but insurers have also become more consolidated over
time and lack incentive to find the edge of negotiations when they can pass price
increases off onto employers (and eventually employees). 92 Even when insurers
push back, providers still often have the upper hand when they are critical to a local
network, as in the case of “must-have” hospitals or large integrated networks of
hospitals and physicians. 93
Medicare, however, preserves a large, unrestricted network of providers despite
lower reimbursement rates. It does so in part because of its scale, which translates
to volume benefits to providers but also makes it difficult for large providers and
hospitals to refuse to accept Medicare patients. It also does so by paying rates that
make Medicare reimbursement acceptable for many providers, and not just when in
mix with privately insured patients. Efficient hospitals were able, until recently, able
to break even based on Medicare reimbursement rates.94
While setting reimbursement rates within an employer public option would be a
delicate task, as we discuss in detail below, for now it is sufficient to note that a
public option that uses Medicare’s rates and network as a starting point would be a
viable mechanism for reducing the cost of care. In addition, a public option should
also enjoy reduced administrative costs compared to current employer plans due to
economies of scale and simplification.
For employees, an employer public option thus offers the possibility of lower
health care costs delivered by a less restricted network of providers. If cost savings
of public over private coverage are preserved even in part, savings should in theory
translate into wage growth and increased employment, since we know that rising
88

Id.
Martin Gaynor, Examining the Impact of Health Care Consolidation, Statement before the Committee on
Energy and Commerce Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee U.S. House of Representatives 8-9 (Feb. 14,
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20180214/106855/HHRG-115-IF02-Wstate-GaynorM2018),
20180214.pdf. (last accessed Feb. 15, 2021).
90
Id.
91
Sebastian Herrera & David Benoit, Why the Amazon, JPMorgan, Berkshire Venture Collapsed: ‘Health
Care Was Too Big a Problem,’ WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2021 (“Despite Amazon, JPMorgan and Berkshire’s collective
size, they lacked scale to garner enough negotiating power with care providers”).
92
Gaynor, supra note 89, at 9.
93
See, e.g., Robert A Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout In California Foreshadows Challenges To
Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 702 (2010) (“‘Must-have’ hospitals, by definition, have market leverage over
health plans, because plans cannot plausibly threaten to exclude them.”).
94
Id.
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health care costs have done the inverse.95 Despite economic growth, wages have
stagnated since the 1970s and many attribute that stagnation in part to health care
cost growth that has well exceeded inflation. 96
b. Expanded Coverage, Especially for Low-Wage Workers
An employer public option also presents an opportunity to meaningfully expand
coverage to the currently uninsured, through a combination of lowering prices and
increasing the availability of subsidies. As just described, the cost of coverage
should decrease under the public option through a combination of lower
reimbursement rates and lowered administrative expenses, which should in turn
increase the number of employees who elect offered coverage. In addition, an
employer public option would provide an opportunity to expand the subsidies
currently available to low- and moderate-income individuals who purchase coverage
on the individual market.
There are currently twenty-six million employees who either are not offered
coverage by their own firms or are offered and decline coverage. 97 In 2019, only
57.9 percent of employees at large firms enrolled in employer sponsored health
insurance. 98 Roughly twenty percent of employees were ineligible for ESI because
of waiting periods or part-time/temporary work status. 99 Of those eligible for
insurance, only seventy-six percent elected to purchase it. 100 Many of those
declining to take up ESI offers likely obtained coverage elsewhere (often under the
health plan of another family member or through public programs like Medicaid),
but some no doubt turned down the coverage because of the cost or other
considerations.
According to recent research by the Commonwealth Fund, the composition of
uninsured Americans has shifted dramatically since 2010 so that a larger portion are
now working uninsured. 101 Back when the ACA was enacted, fifty percent of
working-age uninsured Americans were unemployed. By 2018, as a result of the
ACA’s expansion of coverage, only thirty-eight percent of the working-age
95
Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra, The Labor Market Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums,
24 J. LABOR ECON. 609 (2006), at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/505049?mobileUi=0&.
There are no guarantees, of course, that cost savings will reach workers’ pockets, especially in industries where the
balance of power between labor and employers has become lopsided. Eventually as Medicare covers more or most
of the population, we would hope that workers experience an increase in wages, but these offsets are difficult to
explain to the public and not guaranteed, which made the transition to MFA more challenging politically. Some
experts propose attempting to legislate the return of such savings into workers pockets, but guaranteeing they remain
there in the long-run equilibrium would be difficult. See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, We Can Afford
Medicare For All, POLITICO (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2019/11/25/agenda-can-weafford-medicare-for-all-071560.
96
Mark J. Warshawsky & Andrew G. Biggs, Income Inequality and Risking Health-Care Costs, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 2014, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/mark-warshawsky-and-andrew-biggs-income-inequality-and-risinghealth-care-costs-1412568847?wpisrc=nl-wonkbk&wpmm=1.
97
KFF Employer Health Benefits 2020, supra note 13, at 58.
98
Id..
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Munira Z. Gunja & Sarah R. Collins, Who Are the Remaining Uninsured, and Why Do They Lack
Coverage?,
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(August
2019),
at
11,
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Gunja_who_are_remaining_uninsured_sb.pdf.
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uninsured were unemployed. In contrast, the share of the uninsured who work full
time has increased from thirty percent in 2010 to forty-two percent in 2018, while
the share of those who work part-time stayed constant at nineteen percent during this
period. Thus, in 2018, over sixty percent of the uninsured were employed. While
more work needs to be done to understand exactly who are the working uninsured,
the studies of Medicaid-eligible workers offer evidence of the labor attributes of
low-wage workers without employer coverage. Nearly half of this population work
at firms with more than 100 employees, 102 with heavy concentrations in the service
sector and agriculture. 103
Subsidies offered through an employer public option could improve rates of
coverage among the low-wage working population. Under the current system,
employees who are offered affordable and adequate coverage are ineligible for the
premium tax credits that are available for exchange-based individual coverage. Yet,
for many the cost of their share of employer coverage—without subsidies—is
unaffordable. An employer public option offers an attractive mechanism for
rationalizing current subsidy design. Our subsidy proposal, detailed in the next
subpart, envisions providing the same subsidies to participants in an employer public
option as those that are provided on the individual market.
c. Addressing Churn and Portability
An employer public option, particularly if widely adopted, could also help
address other systemic issues, such as churn between employer-provided coverage
and Medicaid, and the care disruptions that often occur when individuals switch
employment or lose jobs. Rather than falling out of private insurance coverage as
they do today, workers covered by a public option could more easily and seamlessly
retain their health care coverage if unemployed or moving between jobs.
For example, if an employer public option is offered alongside an individual
public option, an individual who loses employer-provided coverage could
seamlessly switch to individual coverage at subsidized rates, if applicable. Similarly,
the employer public option could be a Medicaid coverage option that allows lowincome individuals to retain their employer-provided coverage even when their
income dips to Medicaid-eligibility levels.
2. Ability to Test Transition to a Single-Payer System
One of the most significant benefits offered by an employer public option is the
ability to enroll in short order large numbers of participants – significantly more than
one primarily for individuals, particularly if large employers are targeted.104 If just
a small number of major employers elected to participate, hundreds of thousands of
households would transition to the public option, providing a meaningful
ARE UNINSURED ADULTS WHO COULD GAIN MEDICAID COVERAGE WORKING?, THE KAISER COMMISSION
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED (Kaiser Family Foundation, Feb. 2015), available at
http://files.kff.org/attachment/fact-sheet-are-uninsured-adults-who-could-gain-medicaid-coverage-working
103
Id.; Jennifer Tolbert, What Issues Will Uninsured People Face with Testing and Treatment for COVID19?, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (March 16, 2020), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/what-issues-willuninsured-people-face-with-testing-and-treatment-for-covid-19/.
102

ON

104
Linda J. Blumberg et al., Health Policy Center, Estimating the Impact of a Public Option or Capping
Provider Payment Rates (Mar. 2020), at https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2020/03/23/estimating-theimpact-of-a-public-option-or-capping-provider-payment-rates.pdf
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opportunity to collect data and to test the feasibility of expanding Medicare over
time. It would also allow refinement over time in cooperation with sophisticated
private industry partners. If several major employers make the leap and it works, it
might persuade others that the benefits of their siloed private plans are not worth
maintaining.

B. Design Features of an Employer Public Option
For an employer public option to be successful – both in terms of providing
valuable coverage to employees and facilitating structural reform – it must be
carefully designed. The design details will, of course, determine whether an
employer public option is politically feasible and also whether employers, especially
large employers, can be enticed to give up current private coverage for a public
alternative.
This section explores the key design features that will be necessary to navigate
carefully to create a plausible policy and a competitive plan. Although we do not
intend to solve all of these details perfectly here, we mention several that we think
are the most important and explain their significance. We also describe how we
would approach these design choices, recognizing that many readers might have
different preferences, but proceeding under the assumption that there is value in
setting forth a concrete proposal.
1. Voluntary Structure
Critically, there would be no mandatory change in employer health care plans,
which was a political stumbling block for Medicare for All in the Democratic
primaries and in many previous health care reform efforts. Participation would be
entirely voluntary on the part of employers, and would be subject to the same labor
market pressures and cost concerns that currently inform their health plan decisionmaking. Indeed, large employers are the most sophisticated health finance decision
makers in our current system. 105 Individuals would almost certainly be more
receptive to a public option if selected and offered by their employers than if
imposed on them by the government. They might still resist the initial switch, but
that transition could be managed.
This voluntary feature is critical for two reasons. First, it insulates the approach
from criticism that it infringes upon individual autonomy or market forces.
Employers will only adopt a public option plan if they conclude that is it in their best
interest or in the best interest of their employees to do so. Second, a public option
for employers structured in this way would reduce the budgetary impact of
expanding public coverage, as compared with either Medicare for All or even
leading public options programs focused on individuals. Current employer and
employee contributions to employer-sponsored health insurance could be retained—
105
Of course, employers do not always get it right. Some of the best research illumining how employees make
poor choices was made possible by their employers offering what are called “dominated” health plans. These plans
are worse in than an alternative option for all possible enrollees in all possible scenarios. No employee should
choose such plans and no wise employer should have it on the menu of options. One of the most well-known of
these studies was conducted at University of Michigan, which one might think would have a sophisticated HR
department. Sinaiko & Hirth, supra note 57. But compared to individuals navigating options, many employers,
especially large ones, would be able to identify a public option that is better than what they offer privately.
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in whole or in part—to finance an employer-based public option. We review the
budgetary treatment of a public option for employers in Part III, but, for current
purposes, it is sufficient to note that, from a fiscal perspective, a public option for
employers has considerable advantages over other approaches.
2. Target Market
At least as an initial matter, we think the best policy target would be large
employers, especially employers with more than 1000 employees. This would
enable a smooth roll out to a meaningful number of people in a streamlined way. It
would also allow partnering with a few large employers to test and refine the idea to
demonstrate effectiveness and to refine policy details in the initial years of
implementation.
Roughly 61.2 million or 46.6% of all private sector employees in the United
States are located in these larger firms, as are a comparable percentage of employees
covered by employer sponsored health insurance. 106 But even more important than
gross numbers is efficiency in distribution. There are approximately twelve
thousand firms with more than 1000 employees in the United States, implying an
average of roughly six thousand employees per firm. 107 By way of contrast,
according to Census data from 2017, there are nearly six million U.S. firms with
fewer than 50 employees and more than five million of these have fewer than 20
employees. 108
Another advantage of focusing on larger employers is that nearly all of these
firms already offer health insurance to their employees, likely making them more
receptive to a solution that could improve upon their status quo. Importantly, these
firms already have the health insurance expertise to make informed decisions in this
area, either through their own human resources staff or outside benefit consultants.
To the extent that an employer public option offers a strong value proposition, large
employers should be well equipped to evaluate the relevant data.
3. Exclusivity Requirements
Although it is possible to do otherwise, we recommend employers have to opt
either to retain their private plan or to move all employees to the public option.
Exclusivity would maximize equity and diminish adverse selection concerns—that
employers would try to encourage employees with greater medical needs to choose
the public option. 109 An exclusivity requirement would also lessen the need for
See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV.,
EXPENDITURE
PANEL
SURVEY
(2019),
,
MEDICAL
https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2019/tia1.pdf.
107
The MEPS data cited in the preceding footnotes reports on establishments rather than firms, but BLS data
indicates that the number of large firms is on the order of the twelve thousand figure cited in the text. See U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE SECTOR FIRMS BY SIZE CLASS,
https://www.bls.gov/web/cewbd/table_g.txt . These figures are substantially consistent with more comprehensive
Census Department data for 2017, which reports on both firms and establishments. See UNITED STATES CENSUS
BUREAU, 2017 SUSB ANNUAL DATA TABLES BY ESTABLISHMENT INDUSTRY (Mar. 2020),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/susb/2017-susb-annual.html.
108
Id.
109
Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick
Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125 (2011).
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complexities associated with experienced-based pricing and similar safeguards. It
would prevent redoubling the problems with individual-level health plan decisionmaking, as discussed above.
On the other hand, many employers today offer a range of health care plan
options and some employers – especially larger employers–-regard the ability to
provide gold-plated health care plans as important tool in attracting top talent.
Unions, as well, may object to a strict exclusivity requirement as reducing the
potential scope of collective bargaining agreements. Fewer employers may thus
choose a public option if it is the only plan they can offer.
In the end, we think employers should be required to adopt the public option as
an exclusive base health care plan for all employees, 110 but could offer supplemental
policies with more extensive benefits for all or some of their workforce, including,
for example, those covered by collective bargaining agreements.
4. Pricing and Financing of a Public Option Plan
The financial terms of the public option can benefit both employers and
employees. An important question is how much of what is currently used to finance
employer-sponsored health insurance could and should be captured to finance an
employer-based public option. According to 2020 data, the average total annual
premium for employer-provided health care coverage was $21,342 for family
coverage and $7470 for single coverage. 111 On average, workers picked up eighteen
percent of the premium for single coverage and thirty percent for family coverage.
Plan details, of course, vary considerably across employers, with larger employers
generally offering more generous benefits than smaller employers. Current cost
structures could serve as a pricing benchmark and something close to current
premiums for private insurance plans could potentially be available to finance an
employer public option.
Although is possible to use experience-based pricing—that is, pricing adjusted
over time by employer based on its employees’ medical care costs—doing so would
cut squarely against coverage and equity goals. Experience based pricing is
consistent with current practices as most large employers (79.9%) self-insure their
health care coverage, 112 and fully-insured policies for large employers are generally
experience rated. 113 That said, if one goal is to encourage employers to adopt a

For current purposes, we leave to the side questions as to how define the boundaries of an employer in the
case of affiliate firms or those organized as conglomerates engaged in substantially different lines of business.
111
KFF Employer Health Benefits 2020, supra note 13, at 6.
112
Authors
calculations
from
https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2019/tia1.pdf (Table I.A.2.a).
113
Questions of experience rating interact with those addressed just below on whether employers must move
all employees over to a public option, or are allowed to offer other plans as well. If the latter, experience rating may
be advisable to combat employer sorting among plan choices. Among small employers, most only offer one plan,
which eliminates concerns of employee sorting if that plan becomes the public option. Only 32.9% of employers
with fewer than 50 employees have two or more plans. Authors calculations from
https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2019/tia1.pdf (Table I.A.2.d). On the other
hand, a very high percentage – 88.2% -- of employers with more than 1000 employees offer two or more health care
plans. Id.
110
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public option for lower-wage workers with more costly health care needs,
experience-rating would undermine that goal. 114
5. Contributions from Employers & Employees
Whatever the premiums in the public option plan, attention should also be given
to how those costs are shared between employers and employees. Employer
sponsored plans currently require different levels of employee contributions. One
could imagine a public option for employers imposing a standard sharing
arrangement for all participating employers (say, a 70/30 split that reflects
something close to current practices for family coverage) or allowing employers to
continue with whatever sharing arrangement they currently have with employees, or
a transitional approach where employers are allowed to stay with current practices
for some period of time, but gradually moving to a uniform approach.
Especially to the extent that a public option reduces costs of employer sponsored
coverage, employers might attempt to capture that savings. Accordingly, some
safeguards could ensure that premium sharing between employers and employees
not be altered to redistribute the cost of health care coverage. While various
approaches could work, one simple approach would be to require employers already
providing ESI to maintain the current division of employer-employee contributions
for some period of years. Employers offering ESI for the first time could be required
to adopt industry average contribution rates, such as a 70/30 split. This approach
would tolerate differences in employer-employee contributions among employers at
least through some transitional period, but would ensure that employees share in any
costs savings on overall premium payments. 115 Another approach, and the one we
adopt for purposes of our subsidy proposal below, is to impose a fixed contribution
percentage for all employers.
6. Incorporating ACA Subsidies
To maximize enrollment of low-income workers, there is potential to
incorporate ACA subsidies into employer coverage. While adding to fiscal costs,
this feature might contribute substantially to the number of workers covered by an
employer public option, especially among those who currently decline enrollment in

For employers with low-income and less-healthy workforces, experience-based pricing could
disincentivizes selecting an employer public option. In this context, pricing that is blind to employee health status
could be seen as a positive rather than a negative because employees in greater need of medical care and less able
to afford it will gain access. Cf. Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity in
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon
eds., 2002) (describing how increased use of medical care with insurance might indeed be a good thing since it
could mean that people who previously needed care but did not receive it are able to do so without insurance). It
might give employers with a less healthy workforce more chance to operate without shouldering an excessive share
of health care costs of American workers. It might mean those workers get better benefits than they would
otherwise. And it might mean that lower-paid workers are able to get better healthcare without seeing their wages
stagnate. Plus, it might make sense that part of the cost of keeping higher-risk workforces healthy should be crosssubsidized.
114

115
On this dimension, we diverge from proposals that anchor public option costs for employers to current
premium levels, and anchor instead on current allocations of premium costs. We contemplate uniform pricing of
public option plans for employers, with potential experience adjustments.
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ESI for financial reasons or whom employers predict would do so and thus exclude
from coverage. 116
The ACA addressed the unaffordability of privately-financed coverage in two
ways, through premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies. Premium costs for
individual insurance policies purchased on ACA exchanges are subsidized for
individuals with household income between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty
level through refundable tax credits. These subsidies cover the difference between
a specified percentage of household income and the cost of the “benchmark plan”
available to the individual, on a sliding scale. 117 Individuals who are offered
employer coverage that is considered affordable and adequate by the ACA are not,
however, eligible for these subsidies. In effect this means that people offered
coverage through work are rarely eligible for subsidies.
Even worse, the definition of what is “affordable” coverage under the ACA puts
many families at a sharp disadvantage when a member of the family is offered
coverage at work. The ACA provides that employer coverage is “affordable” when
an employee’s required contribution is less than 9.78% of household income, 118 and
adequate if the actuarial value of the plan is at least 60%. Regulations, however,
base the affordability calculation solely on the required contribution for employeeonly coverage, even if the employee desires family coverage. 119 For example,
assume an employee is married with two minor children and has household income
of $65,500 per year. Her employer offers her health insurance where the required
contribution for employee-only coverage is $5,000, while the contribution for family
coverage is $10,000. Because the contribution for employee-only coverage is equal
to 7.6% of the employee’s household income, the ACA deems that coverage
affordable, even though family coverage would cost 15.3% of household income.
Because the family is deemed to have “affordable” employer coverage under this
test, no one in the family may receive a premium tax credit on the individual market.
If this same family had not been offered employer coverage at all, they would have
been eligible for a tax credit that would allow them to purchase subsidized silverlevel coverage for the entire family with a household required contribution of $5,456
annually. 120 As this example known as the “family glitch” illustrates, under the
current system, individuals can be made worse off by being offered employer116
As ineligible workers are typically lower-paid, many employers may have rationally concluded that many
of these individuals would not wish to participate in an employer-sponsored health care plan. But this calculation
might change if ACA-style subsidies were available.
117
I.R.C. § 36B. The benchmark plan is the second lowest-cost silver level plan available to the individual. Id.
§36B(b)(3)(B). For example, an individual with household income equal to 150% of the federal poverty level would
receive a credit equal to the difference between 4.12% of household income and the cost of the benchmark plan,
while an individual with household income of 375% of federal poverty receives a credit equal to the difference
between 9.78% of income and the cost of the benchmark plan See Rev. Proc. 2019-29.
118
The statute sets affordability at 9.5% of income, subject to future annual adjustments based on growth in
income and growth in premiums. For 2020, affordability is set at 9.78% of income. Rev. Proc. 2019-29. Note that
this calculation does not account for the part of health care costs that the employer funds. So with a typical 70/30
employer/employee split, affordability is measured only with respect to 30 percent employee contribution.

Treas. Reg. §1.36B-2(c)(3)(v)(A)(1).
This amount was calculated using an income of $65,500 for a family of four, which is equal to 250% of the
federal poverty level for 2021, and a resulting premium tax credit equal to the difference between the cost of silver
coverage and 8.33% of income.
119
120
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provided coverage because it causes them to lose premium subsidies that would
otherwise be available to them based on their income level.
The second ACA mechanism to address the problem of unaffordability is costsharing subsidies that lower the out-of-pocket costs of receiving care once insured.
These cost-sharing subsidies are available to individuals with household income
between 100% and 250% of the federal poverty level, but only if they purchase
silver-level coverage on an exchange. 121 As with the premium tax credits just
described, these subsidies are unavailable to low- and moderate-income individuals
who are offered affordable and adequate coverage by an employer. Because of this
limitation on eligibility, low- and moderate-income individuals again may be made
financially worse off by an offer of employer-provided coverage. The cost-sharing
subsidies require insurers to lower out-of-pocket maximums 122 and increase the
percentage of covered expenses on average paid by the insurer from the 70%
generally required for silver-level coverage to at least 73% and in some cases as high
as 94%. The threshold for “adequate” employer coverage, by contrast, requires the
plan to pay, on average, only 60% of covered expenses. It is therefore possible that
a low-income employee offered coverage by an employer could both pay more in
health insurance premiums and receive much less generous coverage than would be
available if the employer offered no coverage at all.
An employer public option presents an attractive mechanism to help address the
shortcomings and distortions present in these two affordability tools. Specifically,
the public option could provide premium subsidies that are consistent with those
offered on the individual market and could feasibly calculate and implement the
required employee contributions. In addition, the public option could vary costsharing schedules by income. For example, the public option might specify that
individuals with income at or below 150% of federal poverty pay a $5 copay for an
office visit, moderate income enrollees pay $15, and everyone else pays $25.
Implementing income-based cost-sharing schedules on the scale of a public option
is much more efficient than every employer trying to do so.
While cost-sharing subsidies are relatively straight forward, premium subsidies
are less so, and are worth a bit more discussion. There are many possible subsidy
designs that could be implemented in conjunction with an employer public option,
but we envision an approach that smooths subsidy design between employer and
individually purchased coverage and allows employers a simplified method of
satisfying the existing employer mandate. We present here one possible approach
with these goals in mind.
In order to ensure that employer money stays in the system, the public option
could specify a minimum required employer contribution percentage for all
coverage tiers (employee-only, employee plus spouse, and family coverage, for
These cost-sharing subsidies are complicated because they require the insurer to reduce cost sharing to
increase the actuarial value of the plan from 70% to between 73% and 94% for the individual, depending on income.
It is up to the insurer how to adjust deductibles, coinsurance, and copays to hit the required actuarial values for the
various income tiers.
122
Individual marketplace plans can have an out-of-pocket maximum no higher than $8,550 for individual
coverage in 2021. Out-of-pocket maximums for those eligible for cost-sharing reductions can be no higher than
$2,850 to $6,800 for an individual. Similar reductions apply to family level coverage.
121
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example). 123 While setting a flat employer contribution percentage of, say, 70% of
the cost of coverage—based on the average employer share of a family plan—may
not perfectly capture existing employer contributions, it could likely get close in the
aggregate and has the benefit of treating all employers equally. To prevent distortion
between individual and employer market subsidies, we assume the same subsidy
amount and structure would be available to employer public option participants as
those in the individual market, with the public option calculating the available
premium subsidies for potentially eligible participants, as the exchanges currently
do for individually-purchased coverage. If premium subsidies continue to be based
on the percentage of household income a family is required to pay for health
insurance, the public option could gather the requisite income information and
inform the employer of the required employee contribution amounts so that each
eligible employee’s payroll deduction reflects the subsidized cost of public option
coverage. If the employee’s household income is low, the federal subsidies might
fully cover the employee’s contribution and then could be applied to subsidize part
of the employer’s share as well, to create additional incentives for employers to
extend coverage to their low-income employees. As with the current individual
market subsidies, final subsidy amounts could be reconciled when an employee files
his or her tax return for the year. Finally, because the current employer mandate is
based on whether the employer offers full-time employees affordable coverage,
employers participating in the public option could be deemed to satisfy the employer
mandate without having to engage in any complicated calculations. 124
Addressing the current shortcomings of the ACA’s affordability tools through
an employer public option has advantages over addressing them through either an
individual public option or the current employer-based system. One frequently
proposed solution to the subsidy problem is to change eligibility provisions so that
anyone eligible on the basis of income can purchase a subsidized marketplace plan,
irrespective of any available employer-provided coverage. 125 But that approach fails
to capture current employer health care contributions, placing more burden on the
government to fund the cost of coverage if someone opts for individual coverage
and out of an employer plan. It also places a significant burden on low-income
individuals, who must learn of individual market subsidies, decide if they are better
off with those subsidies and an ACA plan versus employer subsidies and an ESI
plan, and purchase such coverage. Harnessing the ability of employers, particularly
large employers, to educate employees, facilitate enrollment, and subsidize coverage
123
As mentioned earlier, there may be value in allowing employers currently providing employer sponsored
insurance to transition from current cost sharing arrangements to the fixed percentages assumed in the text. For
simplicity, the example given above assumes uniform cost-sharing arrangements.
124
While deeming the employer mandate satisfied is a straightforward regulatory simplification where the
employer allows all employees to elect the public option, a more nuanced approach might be warranted where only
certain employee segments are able to participate.
125
Vice President Biden has proposed this type of universal subsidy availability, in addition to other changes
to subsidy amounts and income limits. Cynthia Cox et al., Kaiser Family Foundation, Affordability in the ACA
Marketplace Under a Proposal Like Joe Biden’s Health Plan, at https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issuebrief/affordability-in-the-aca-marketplace-under-a-proposal-like-joe-bidens-health-plan/ (In addition, Biden would
allow workers with an offer of job-based coverage to enroll in Marketplace plans with subsidies if that would be a
better deal. Under current law, employees qualify for Marketplace subsidies only if their employer’s plan is deemed
unaffordable or does not satisfy minimum coverage requirements.)(2020).
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offers distinct advantages over solutions that rely on individual initiative. In
addition, because large employers could add significant numbers of public option
enrollees compared to an individually-focused solution, the problem of Medicaid
churn could be much more broadly addressed.
It is even less plausible to address the current shortcomings through existing
employer plans. Doing so would be difficult for a host of reasons, including the lack
of standardization among employer plans and the need to have a sophisticated
interface between employers and the government to advance premium tax credits.
How would the government determine the correct level of subsidy, for example, if
employer plans can differ fundamentally in their coverage terms and generosity?
While income-based cost-sharing could perhaps be implemented within the current
employer system, doing so would involve significant duplication of effort across
thousands of plans.
To be clear, our proposed solutions do not address the universe of distortions
and inequities caused by the current tax treatment of health insurance and medical
expenses. While there are many, the best known and most expensive is the tax
preference for employer-provided coverage, which is one of our largest tax
expenditures, resulting in an estimated $179.2 billion of forgone revenue in fiscal
year 2021. 126 Because this subsidy takes the form of an exclusion from otherwise
taxable income, the value of the subsidy varies with an individual’s marginal tax
rate, with the result that those in the highest tax brackets receive the greatest benefit
(a structure commonly referred to in the tax literature as an “upside down” subsidy).
Although we do not propose to take on this long-standing and long-criticized tax
benefit as part of our public option proposal, we note that rationalizing premium tax
credits and cost-sharing subsidies between the employer and individual markets
would at least help offset the upside-down nature of other tax benefits for employerprovided coverage.
7. Network and Reimbursement Rates
A singular advantage the public option could have over existing employer plans
is the ability to offer a broad, unrestricted provider network. 127 When Americans
espouse their allegiance to health care choice, many likely care more about their
choice of doctor than their choice of insurance plan. Most hospitals and many
doctors accept reimbursement from Medicare, which means that someone who has
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATE OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 20202024 33(2020). By comparison, the cost of current exchange-based subsidies for health insurance is estimated to be
55.1 billion in fiscal year 2020. Id.
127
A major political and technocratic question is whether the public option is based on traditional Medicare,
which has an open network, or Medicare Advantage, Medicare plans operated by private insurers on behalf of
Medicare that control costs in large part through narrow networks, like an HMO. While basing a public option on
Medicare Advantage would be more appealing to the insurance industry because it would guarantee them a more
substantive role in the future of health insurance, and greater excuse for retaining profits, enrollees might be worse
off, certainly in terms of network and in other regards as well. See Amanda Starc, Who Benefits from Medicare
Advantage? WHARTON PUBLIC POLICY INITIATIVE 1 (2014). See also CMA Staff, CMA Alert. CENTER FOR
MEDICARE ADVOCACY (2017) (discussing gatekeeping requirements in MA plans for specialty care). The Unity
Task Force has proposed an individual public option based on traditional Medicare, not Medicare Advantage, but
the space between what is on the page in that proposal and what is feasible in Congress might prove formidable.
Press Release, JoeBiden.com, Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations 31 (Aug. 2020), at
https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf.
126
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a public option based on Medicare—so long as provider participation is tied to
Medicare participation—would have a broad choice of providers. Even though many
employer plans have relatively broad networks, it is possible that as employers
continue to work to control health care spending, more may turn to narrow networks,
as the ACA individual plans have done. Even compared to the current baseline in
employer plans, a shift to a public option will increase provider choice for many
employees.
In the short term, however, some people may lose access to a provider who
participates in their private plan but not in Medicare. Over time, if more large
employers selected the public option, more and more providers would be forced to
accept it for reimbursement, but that tipping point could take time.
One of the most complicated aspects of this proposal is how to set
reimbursement rates to preserve and ensure a wide provider network. Although we
do not begin to solve this aspect here, we note why we think it is feasible to move
to a system with reimbursement based on and closer to Medicare rates than to private
insurance rates. As noted above, providers participate in large numbers in the
Medicare program both because of the volume benefits and because evidence
suggests that Medicare rates were, until recently, sufficient that efficient hospitals
could profit based on them. 128 In recent years, the rates have dipped slightly below
break-even, but would require very little upward adjustment to enable
profitability. 129 Reimbursement rates could be marked up considerably over
Medicare rates to ensure adequate provider participation, while still offering cost
savings as compared to current private reimbursement rates.
Over time, rates could be adjusted to ensure provider participation, especially
by providers who are important to the large employer market. While a relatively
modest transfer of employer-sponsored plan enrollment over to a public option with
rates close to current Medicare reimbursement rates would not have a significant
impact on hospital revenues, more substantial movements of coverage would. With
such revenue decreases, even if many providers could operate more efficiently and
maintain profitability, plan design would have to account for what levels of
decreases are manageable operationally and, perhaps more important, politically.
Employer-based public option plans could have a formula for reimbursement
increases over time as the market share of those plans increased. Given existing
inefficiencies, margins would not need to be fully equalized, but finding the right
level of reimbursement that will maintain provider supply and trim spending will be
one of the hardest aspects of this or any rate-based reform.
8. Benefits and Cost Sharing
An employer public option needs to offer benefits that are comparable to the
average large employer plan in order to viably compete with such plans. Even if
using Medicare as a starting point, it would have to be modified somewhat for a
working population and could be simplified as well. If rolled out in legislation that
also creates a public option for the individual markets, the two programs should be

128
129

Lopez et al., supra note 85.
Id.
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aligned, both as a matter of equity and also to facilitate transitions between the two
forms of public option when people face changing employment status. 130
A public option for employers should, at a minimum, cover the treatments and
services typically covered by typical large employer plans. 131 This was the same
proxy used for setting essential health benefits for plans offered in the individual and
small group markets. 132 While the employer public option may need a modest
augmentation to include treatments and services that are not now covered by
Medicare but are by employer plans, it should largely follow Medicare Coverage
Determinations that determine when certain treatments are covered, based on what
is considered reasonable and necessary, so as to not unnecessarily duplicate efforts.
Cost-sharing should be determined under the same principles. Medicare’s
complicated cost-sharing provisions that result in many enrollees purchasing
supplemental coverage need not serve as the guide for the employer public option in
the same way that it would not for an individual public option (and perhaps should
be revisited for Medicare as well in the future).
Cost-sharing has at least two different components. The first is the overall level
of cost-sharing within a plan, referred to as the plan’s actuarial value. A plan’s
actuarial value represents the percentage of covered expenses paid by the plan for
an average population. Among large employer plans, almost one-quarter have
actuarial values in excess of 90%, with an average actuarial value above 80%.133
The second component is the cost-sharing design, which refers to how costsharing requirements are allocated among particular types of care or points of
service. For example, will there be an annual deductible, or just co-pays and coinsurance? Will the copay for a specialist be higher than the copay for a general
practitioner? Will treatments with a higher value be subject to lower cost-sharing
requirements than those of lower value? Mapping these features to an employer plan
benchmark is more difficult than overall actuarial value because there is significant
variation among plans, and that variation is often based on plan type (e.g., an HMO
is less likely to have an annual deductible than a PPO plan). The public option may
present an opportunity to simplify cost-sharing based on the growing research that
most people do not understand or act according to the complex financial incentives
embedded in their plan structures. 134
130
As discussed below, this alignment is especially important for gig economy workers who repeatedly
transition between traditional employment and self-employment. See Part II.B.10, infra.
131
For an overview of the benefits typically offered by large employer plans, see DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined. (while it can be difficult to determine the precise contours of coverage under
employer plans, most cover a broad range of medical services with substantial differences only in a few areas).
132
42 U.S.C. §18022.
133
See Jon R. Gabel et al., More Than Half of Individual Health Plans Offer Coverage that Falls Short of
What Can be Sold Through Exchanges as of 2014, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1339, 1342 (2012) (finding 41.2% of employer
plans had actuarial values between 80 and 89%, while 23.9% had actuarial values that exceeded 90%).
134
See e.g., Michael Chernew et al., Are Health Care Services Shoppable? Evidence from the Consumption of
Lower
Limb
MRI
Scans,
NBER
Paper
No.
24869,
at
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24869/w24869.pdf; Mary E. Reed et al., In ConsumerDirected Health Plans, A Majority of Patients were Unaware of Free or Low-Cost Preventive Care, 31 HEALTH
AFF. 2641 (2012) (finding that a majority of enrollees were unaware that the deductible did not apply to certain
high-value care, such as preventive office visits, medical tests, and screenings).
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While mirroring the existing norms in the large employer market is likely a
necessary condition to generate employer participation, there is also a case to be
made for structuring the public option to be simpler than the norm, both in order to
encourage participation and also to alleviate some of the burden employees have
borne with recent increases in cost-sharing requirements. 135 That said, it might be
unrealistic to expect an employer public option to be as generous as some of the best
employer plans are today, but employers could choose to fill in the gaps through
supplemental coverage or by increasing wages.
9. Communicating Benefits to Employees (and Employers)
While it is important that the public option offer comparable benefits, it is just
as important that those benefits be easily communicated to employees. Employees
are much more likely to resist a plan change that they do not understand, and health
plans are notoriously difficult for individuals to understand. Time and effort should
be invested in the communications explaining the public option, and should include
not only explanations of common coverage situations, but also a comparison to their
current employer plan options. The ability to rely on employers as translators of the
public option benefits is a major advantage as compared to an individual public
option.
10. Designing for Portability and Integrating with Medicaid
An employer public option could be designed to address two common issues in
the current employer-based system: coverage disruptions that result from job change
or job loss, and churn between employer-provided coverage and Medicaid.
Medicaid expansion, enacted by the ACA, was intended to provide universal
coverage to families at or below 138% of the federal poverty level. 136 In those states
that have elected to participate in the Medicaid expansion, the coverage is typically
provided at very low or no cost to participants. Because eligibility to participate is
tied to household income, many individuals churn between Medicaid eligibility and
employer coverage, even within a single year, as wages and hours change. This
churn is not only inefficient, but has been shown to result in significant care
disruptions. 137
As health care costs have outpaced inflation over the past several decades, many employers have managed
this increase by moving employees onto high deductible health plans where they pay a higher share of medical care
costs. From 2005 to 2020, the share of large firms offering a high-deductible health plan increased from 8% to 67%
and the number of enrollees in such plans increased from 3% in 2006 to 33% in 2020. KFF Employer Health Benefits
2020, supra note 13, §8, Fig. 8.2 and 8.4.
136
States, however, are not obligated to participate in this Medicaid expansion, and currently fourteen states
leave this population uncovered. This expanded Medicaid coverage under the ACA is almost entirely funded by
the federal government with very limited out of pocket expense for beneficiaries.
137
Many individuals with low income cycle between employer-provided coverage and Medicaid as their
income and therefore eligibility fluctuates throughout a year, in a process commonly referred to as “churn.” One
study estimated that as many as half of adults with income below 200% of federal poverty will move between
Medicaid and individual market subsidies in a given year, Benjamin D. Sommer & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in
Health Reform: How Changes in Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between Medicaid and Insurance
Exchanges, 30 HEALTH AFF. 228 (2011), while a more recent study found that, in states that had expanded Medicaid,
13.7% of individuals with Medicaid coverage faced a coverage disruption over the course of a year. Anna L.
Goldman & Benjamin D. Sommers, Among Low-Income Adults Enrolled in Medicaid, Churning Decreased After
the Affordable Care Act, 39 HEALTH AFF. 85 (2020). In states that had not expanded Medicaid, 23.8% of Medicaid
135
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An employer public option could improve continuity of coverage for lowincome workers who currently churn between Medicaid and employer-provided
coverage by specifying that the public option qualifies as Medicaid expansion
coverage. If an employed individual’s projected income falls below 138% of federal
poverty, the individual and the employer would cease contributing to the cost of
coverage, with the Medicaid program paying the full premium for the public option
instead, enabling continuity of coverage through the employer plan. Reducing churn
would dramatically reduce care disruptions for individuals who frequently change
employment or whose income varies in an hourly job. As with premium tax credits
and cost-sharing subsidies, addressing Medicaid churn through an employer public
option provides a solution that private employer plans could not, because we could
not, without further regulation, ensure that private employer plans offer the benefits
and cost-sharing structures that would be appropriate for a Medicaid expansion
population.
With respect to care disruptions caused by changes in employment, the
employer public option again provides some unique solutions. The easiest scenario
is for an employee who leaves one employer who has selected the public option to
another who has also done so. This would be the ideal seamless transition between
jobs with no change in benefits or network. What is less obvious is how to manage
continuous coverage for individuals who leave a job and remain unemployed or
begin work in one of the increasing number of gig-economy jobs without coverage.
Ideally, an individual public option would be implemented alongside the employer
public option, and they would offer identical or nearly-identical coverage and
networks. If that were the case, an individual losing coverage through the employer
public option could shift to the individual market public option, with relevant
subsidies, and not face any care disruptions. The ability to move from employer
coverage to nearly identical individual coverage at subsidized rates would offer a
substantial improvement over the current system, which often results in dramatic
shifts in coverage and providers for affected individuals, not to mention the shear
difficulty of navigating the relevant choices following a loss of job-based coverage.
11. Regulatory Relief
While employers play an important role in providing health insurance coverage
to 154 million Americans, 138 they do so at a significant cost. As detailed in Part
I.C.2, employers must navigate complex legal requirements and make significant
financial and health policy decisions when offering a health plan to employees. A
public option for employers offers the possibility of greatly simplifying the
employer experience.
A key feature of a public option for employers should be to shift from the
employer to the public option nearly all administrative tasks and legal
responsibilities. In order to accomplish this simplified employer experience, ERISA
recipients faced disruption. Churning is obviously inefficient, but it has also been shown to result in delayed medical
care, lower utilization of preventive care, fewer prescription refills, and increased emergency department visits. Id.
138
Kaiser Family Found., Health Insurance Coverage of Non-Elderly 0-64, https://www.kff.org/other/stateindicator/nonelderly-064/?dataView=1&currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc
%22%7D.
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should be amended to provide that employer participation in the public option does
not create an employee benefit plan for purposes of ERISA, thereby relieving
employers of all ERISA obligations with respect to public option participation. Once
an employer elects to participate in the public option, its main responsibilities should
be limited to facilitating employee enrollment, processing payroll contributions, and
transmitting enrollment information to the public option. The public option would
be responsible for reporting and disclosure, claims administration and appeals, and
pursuit of reimbursement claims.
C. Potential Interest in an Employer Public Option
Large employers may have the least incentive to move away from the status quo
because—while burdensome—the coverage they provide is generous and highly
valued by employees. Small employers would in many ways be a more obvious
target for public option participation, given their well-known struggles to offer
quality coverage at a competitive cost, but even a high level of participation by small
firms is unlikely to generate meaningful public option enrollment since nearly threequarters of workers are at large firms. 139 That said, there is reason to believe that
some large employers might welcome the opportunity to relinquish the burden of
running a mini health care operation with escalating costs, if there were a good
enough alternative.
It is difficult to predict how employers of any size are likely to react to the
availability of a public option, but it seems as if interest may be brewing. 140 There is
significant evidence that small employers would in theory be amenable to Medicare
opt in, but less evidence on large employers. One survey found that 64% of
employers were interested in considering a simplified health plan design rather than
the custom solutions created by many large firms, suggesting that a public option
may appeal to those craving simplicity. 141 Another survey, conducted of companies
mostly with 1,000 or more employees, reported that 34% indicated a Medicare
public option could be a helpful reform, even if a majority were resistant to Medicare
for All. 142 Recent polling by Data for Progress suggests a majority of likely voters
supports an employer public option, which could influence employer receptivity. 143
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., MEDICAL
EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY (2018),
https://www.meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2019/tib1.pdf (reporting 96 million
works at firms with 50 or more employees out of 131 million total workers, or about 73%)
140
See, e.g., Susannah Luthi, Why Employers Are Flirting with the Public Option, POLITICO (Feb. 8, 2020,
8:17 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/08/employers-health-care-public-option-112380; Phil
Galewitz, Why Some CEOs Figure ‘Medicare for All’ is Good for Business, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 7, 2019),
https://khn.org/news/a-large-employer-frames-the-medicare-for-all-debate/.
141
JEFFREY C. MCGUINESS, AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY INSTITUTE, CHANGING ATTITUDES AMONG LARGE
EMPLOYERS TOWARDS HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 9 (2017),
http://www.americanhealthpolicy.org/Content/documents/resources/Employer_Attitudes_Towards_HC_Delivery.
pdf.
142
Pulse of the Purchaser: Views on Affordability and Health Reforms, NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF HEALTHCARE
PURCHASER COALITIONS, https://www.nationalalliancehealth.org/www/resources-new/pulse-of-the-purchaser (last
updated Feb. 2020).
143
ETHAN WINTER AND JACOB S. HACKER, DATA FOR PROGRESS, VOTERS SUPPORT A PUBLIC OPTION FOR
HEALTH INSURANCE 8
(October 2020), at https://filesforprogress.org/memos/a-public-option-for-healthinsurance.pdf.
139
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These polls are far from an accurate measure of demand, yet, conceptually even
large employers might be inclined to consider a public option, especially with the
right policy design and incentives. Over the past several decades as health care cost
growth has exceeded inflation and legal compliance costs have increased, managing
a health plan has become increasingly burdensome. Many large employers have had
to redesign plans several times to deal with these costs increases, shuffling cost
increases onto employees in the form of larger cost sharing, which can strain
relationships with employees.
As illustration of employer frustration with the status quo, some of the largest
employers—Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, and JPMorgan Chase—joined forces to
create a new venture, Haven Healthcare to attempt to fundamentally restructure how
their collective employees get healthcare. They recruited Atul Gawande, a leading
voice on healthcare innovation to run Haven. 144 Then, after a short period in this
role, Gawande stepped back in May 2020, and the chief operating officer stepped
down after nine months, suggesting some hurdles. 145 In January 2021, the whole
enterprise folded. 146 Likewise, Walmart created Care Clinics for its employees that
it is now rolling out to the broader public, whose impact remains to be seen. 147
Employers increasingly want better than the status quo, and most will struggle to
invent it themselves.
If only a few large employers were to move their employees into a public option,
it could create a cascading effect. The top twenty largest employers in 2018,
including Walmart, Amazon, UPS, Kroger, Home Depot, alone employed on the
order of ten million people. 148 If even just a few of them were to offer public
coverage for employees and their dependents, the number of enrollees would add up
quickly and would generate a strong incentive for regulators to focus attention on
getting programmatic details right. Those early adopters could be partners to help
monitor and refine the program in the first years.
A public option program could be designed with incentives to encourage large
businesses to be early adopters to counterbalance inertial effects. For example, as
discussed in Part II, participating employers would need to contribute to financing
the public option. There could be lower contribution rates for employers who optin during the initial years, increasing every year thereafter up to a maximum amount.
Businesses that have not selected the public option might worry that the public
plan with provider reimbursement closer to Medicare rates would translate into cost
shifting onto them, where providers charge higher prices for private plans. Evidence
suggests that such practices are possible, at least in some regions where providers
Atul Gawande, A Message from Our Chairman, HAVEN HEALTH CARE, https://havenhealthcare.com/
[https://perma.cc/TLP5-T4FR] (last visited Dec. 23, 2020).
145
Alia Paavola, Haven Sees Exodus of Execs: 8 Things to Know, BECKER’S HOSPITAL REVIEW (August 6,
2020), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-management-administration/haven-sees-exodus-of-execs8-things-to-know.html.
146
Sebastian Herrera & Kimberly Chin, Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway, JPMorgan End Health-Care Venture
Haven, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2021.
147
Elise Reuter, Walmart Divulges Plans for ‘Healthcare Supercenters’, MEDCITYNEWS (Jun. 28, 2020),
https://medcitynews.com/2020/06/walmart-divulges-plans-for-healthcare-supercenters/.
148
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_United_States%E2%80%93based_employers_globally.
144
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have outsized bargaining power and seek to recapture any lost revenue when some
share of their patient population shifts to a lower-reimbursing public option. 149
While this might cause employer opposition initially, it might also lead to the
ultimate success of an employer public option as increasing numbers of employers
decide the public option offers a viable mechanism for controlling costs.
The ACA likewise offers some reason to be circumspect about enthusiasm for
plans to displace existing private employer coverage. As we saw with the small
business health options program (“SHOP”) established by the ACA, rollout needs
to be carefully managed to avoid early disasters, particularly of a technical nature.
While SHOP held theoretical appeal – designed to offer a convenient method for
small employers to shop for coverage and to offer a variety of coverage choices to
employees – it fell far short in practice. Very few small employers chose to use the
SHOP exchanges in the early years, with SHOP enrolling less than one percent of
the small group market in 2016. 150 Today, SHOP exchanges barely exist. 151 While
many factors contributed to the general failure of SHOP, early technical problems
and broker opposition were key elements. 152
Small employers may, based in part on the failure of SHOP, have little trust in
federal solutions to health care. Yet if large employers were to get on board first
with successful results, small employers might follow. Small employers have more
reason than large employers to want to outsource health benefits and have more
explicitly voiced their preference to do so through a public option. 153 Perhaps the
key takeaway is that any employer public option—regardless of where it is offered—
must roll out smoothly and strategically to overcome inertia and other barriers.
We also know from previous health care reform efforts that the support or
opposition of insurers can be critical. 154 Efforts to create a public option in
See James Robinson, Hospitals Respond to Medicare Payment Shortfalls by Both Shifting Costs and Cutting
Them, Based on Market Concentration, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1265 (2011).
150
GAO, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: ENROLLMENT REMAINS CONCENTRATED AMONG FEW ISSUERS,
INCLUDING IN EXCHANGES 30 (Mar. 2019).
151
In 2017, CMS announced that effective January 1, 2018, the federal government would no longer handle
SHOP functions for states that chose not to operate their own SHOP exchanges. SHOP Marketplace Enrollment as
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Dataof
January
2017,
CMS
(May
15,
2017),
Resources/Downloads/SHOP-Marketplace-Enrollment-Data.pdf; Timothy Jost, CMS Announces Plans to
Effectively
End
the
SHOP
Exchange,
HEALTH
AFFAIRS
BLOG
(May
15,
2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170515.060112/full/. As of 2020, only ten states and the District
of Columbia maintain any type of SHOP platform. Id.
152
RHETT BUTTLE ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, SMALL-BUSINESS OWNERS’ VIEWS ON HEALTH
COVERAGE AND COSTS 4 (2019) (69% reporting they rely on a broker to choose a health plan),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Buttle_small_business_owners_survey_ib.pdf.
Marshall Allen, Insurers Hand Out Cash and Gifts to Sway Brokers Who Sell Employer Health Plans, NPR (Feb.
20, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/02/20/694719998/insurers-hand-out-cashand-gifts-to-sway-brokers-who-sell-employer-health-plans.
153
See, e.g., Press Release, Hunter Railey, Colorado Director for Small Business Majority, New Report on
Public Option Opens the Door for More Healthcare Choices for Colorado Small Businesses (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://smallbusinessmajority.org/press-release/new-report-public-option-opens-door-more-healthcare-choicescolorado-small-businesses (small business majority in Colorado voicing support for public option based on
Medicare)
154
Shefali Luthra, Insurers Sank Connecticut’s ‘Public Option.’ Would a National Version Survive?, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 4, 2020), https://khn.org/news/connecticut-public-option-battle-insurers-pushback-federalhealth-care-reform2/.
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Connecticut were defeated in part because of opposition by Cigna and Aetna, two
of the state’s top employers and the state’s largest insurance companies. 155 Yet, if a
federal public option focused on the largest employers, insurance opposition might
be reduced. Most of the largest employers self-insure, 156 which reduces the role for
insurance companies to that of a third-party administrator. While insurers are paid
a per capita monthly fee for such administrative work, it is likely a less profitable
sector than insurance, which allows the insurer to keep at least a certain percentage
of “experience gains.” 157 Because a public option targeted to large employers is less
threatening to an insurer’s profit centers, it is possible that their opposition will be
lower. Of course, to the extent that a public option involves an explicit role for
private insurers as third-party administrators, resistance might be lower still. That
said, it would be naïve to expect insurers to embrace an idea that would eventually
erode much of their business and profits.
There are also, however, reasons to be optimistic. Some large employers may
support the idea and get behind it politically. Labor unions may support an
employer-based public option at greater levels than Medicare for All. During the
leadup to the ACA, major labor unions publicly supported the inclusion of an
individual public option. 158 With respect to Medicare for All, some unions support
it on the basis that it would allow unions to focus more intently on other bargaining
issues such as wages, while other unions oppose it because they do not want to give
up their bargained-for health benefits. 159 In part, the opposition is based on the fact
that some union plans are more generous than Medicare. 160
President Biden explicitly promised during his campaign that, “If you have a
generous union-backed plan and you have given up union wages to get that plan,
you can keep it.” 161 A key advantage of a public option for employers is that it allows
union plans to stay in place. Indeed, if health benefits are subject to a collective
bargaining agreement they would remain unchanged under this proposal. The
decision of an employer to offer the public option to union employees would be
subject to future bargaining upon expiration of the current labor agreement, and
155

Id.
KFF Health Benefits 2020, supra note 13, at 161. Ninety-two percent of firms with 1000 or more workers
self-insure. Id. at 162, Fig. 10.2.
157
While there is almost no publicly available information on the relative profitability of insured lines of
business compared to administrative-only contracts, basic economic principles would suggest that insurers could
charge a risk premium for taking on the uncertainty of medical expenses in a fully insured arrangement. Some
support for this position can be seen in health insurers’ security filings. See, e.g., CVS Health Corp. Annual Report
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Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1117
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could easily accommodate differing union preferences in a way that Medicare for
All could not. This flexibility may allow greater union support for a public option
for employers than is possible for other reform proposals under serious
consideration.

III. FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: SCORING AN EMPLOYER PUBLIC
OPTION

We turn now to the fiscal implications of an employer public option. From this
perspective, the employer public option has a much smaller footprint that MFA,
while still catalyzing structural improvement to healthcare financing. We start with
a short primer on the basic principles of federal budgeting for exchange transactions
as opposed to direct government spending. We next show how those principles have
been applied to the scoring of Medicare for All proposals as well as some of the
more prominent public options. We then describe how an employer public option
would likely be scored, contrasting that approach with other leading health reform
plans. Finally, we conclude by examining the likelihood that an employer public
option could be established through budget reconciliation.

A Short Primer on Federal Budgeting for Exchange Transactions
Our current system for accounting for the federal budget was set forth by the
President’s Commission on Budget Concepts in 1967.162 One of the controversial
budgetary issues of the day was how the federal budget should account for the many
instances in which governmental entities interacted with the general public through
market-like transactions, ranging from concession stands at the Smithsonian
Museum to operations at national parks where visitors paid an entrance fee to the
many different areas, from flood insurance to land leasing programs, where
members of the public chose to make payments to government entities in exchange
for goods or services. Since all involved payment to a government entity, would all
of those receipts be considered comparable to federal taxes and therefore included
in government revenues for purposes of budgetary aggregates or should receipts of
this sort be treated differently for the purposes of the federal budget? To address
these questions, the Commission’s report included a chapter on “Offsetting Receipts
Against Expenditures” and specified:
“For purposes of summary budget totals, receipts from activities
which are essentially governmental in character, involving regulation
or compulsion, should be reported as receipts. But receipts associated
with activities which are operated as business-type enterprises, or
which are market-oriented in character, should be included as offsets
to expenditures to which they relate.” 163
As the report explained, when dealing with “enterprise-type” government
activities, net costs to the government – that is expenditures less offsetting receipts
162
See M. Rodgers & D. Sullivan, H.L.S., Reconsidering the President’s Commission on Budget Concepts of
1967:
Budget
Policy
Briefing
Paper
No.
30
(May
10,
2006),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/President_Commission_30.pdf.
163
See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON BUDGET CONCEPTS 65 (Oct. 1967).
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– is the relevant measure of public support and thus inclusion in budgetary
aggregates. And as long as the underlying transactions were voluntary in nature and
subject to market discipline, incorporating gross revenues and receipts into
budgetary aggregates would give “an exaggerated view of the Government’s role in
the economy.” 164 In recognition that the overall size of the operation of government
enterprises remains a topic of public interest, the Commission proposed that the
appropriate approach was to include supplemental information on total revenues and
expenditures in supporting budgetary documents, but to include only net
expenditures into budgetary aggregates, such as total government revenues and
spending.
The approach laid out in 1967 remains the practice today. In the Analytical
Perspectives section of Office and Management and Budget’s most recent budget
documents, the budget office invoked the work of the President’s Commission and
offered a similar justification for this aspect of budgetary practice:
Most of the funds collected through offsetting collections and offsetting receipts
from the public arise from business-like transactions with the public. Unlike
governmental receipts, which are derived from the Government’s exercise of its
sovereign power, these offsetting collections and offsetting receipts arise primarily
from voluntary payments from the public for goods or services provided by the
Government. They are classified as offsets to outlays for the cost of producing the
goods or services for sale, rather than as governmental receipts. These activities
include the sale of postage stamps, land, timber, and electricity; charging fees for
services provided to the public (e.g., admission to national parks); and collecting
premiums for health care benefits (e.g., Medicare Parts B and D). As described
above, treating offsetting collections and offsetting receipts as offsets to outlays
ensures the budgetary totals represent governmental rather than market activity. 165
As this excerpt helpfully notes, premiums for Medicare programs are one
enumerated example of offsets in the current federal budget, as are comparable
charges for federal flood insurance and a host of other market based transactions
with government entities. 166 Although these premiums reflect private payments to
government entities, they are not counted as government revenues or taxes in
budgetary aggregates. 167 This approach accurately makes these programs look less
Id. at 64.
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, Chapter 12: Offsetting Collections and Offsetting Receipts, in
ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES
141
(2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/ap_12_offsetting_fy21.pdf (emphasis added).
166
Reliance on voluntarily paid premiums to cover a good portion of for what become Medicare Part B along
with its budgetary implications was a crucial step in the passage of the original Medicare legislation back in 1965.
See THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE, 2d (1973); Julian E. Zelizer, How Medicare Was Made,
THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 15, 2015). See generally Eric M. Patashnik & Julian E. Zelizer, Paying for Medicare:
Benefits, Budgets, and Wilbur Mills’s Policy Legacy, 26 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY & LAW 7 (2001).
167
One additional refinement with respect to offsetting payments is their relationship to the law of
appropriations. Here, there are two basic approaches: offsetting collections and offsetting receipts, and the
distinction is important in terms of whether the payment generates “budget authority” on the part of the receiving
entity. The difference is explained in the following excerpt from the GAO’s Principles of Appropriations:
164
165

[W]e discuss two types of collections that may be received by the government: offsetting collections and
offsetting receipts. Offsetting collections are collections authorized by law to be credited to appropriation or fund
expenditure accounts. Generally, offsetting collections are collections resulting from business-type or marketoriented activities, such as the sale of goods or services to the public, and intragovernmental transactions. For
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expensive as a fiscal matter: were the CBO to score a public option for employers
for purposes of estimating its impact on the federal deficit or spending aggregates,
employer contributions and the costs they cover would not be included, making
legislative passage far more likely.

An Overview of Scoring Estimates for Medicare for All &
Prominent Public Option Plans
Public debates over the cost of MFA as well as prominent public option plans
illustrate how these scoring conventions play out in practice and were detrimental to
MFA proposals. Table One below reproduces a chart from a recent Committee for
Responsible Federal Budget paper titled “Primary Care: Estimating Democratic
Candidates’ Health Plans (Feb. 26, 2020). The table focuses on the central estimates
for four different plans: Vice President Biden’s and Mayor Peter Buttigieg’s public
option plans and then two MFA plans, Senator Sanders’s and Senator Warren’s. The
chart breaks down effects into four components: increased federal costs for
expanded and improved coverage, assumed savings from programmatic changes,
direct offsets (from tax feedback effects and direct taxes), and indirect offsets from
tax and spending adjustments in other areas. It presents the ten year fiscal impacts
of the four proposals.

example, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to collect recreation fees from visitors to national parks. These
fees are available for expenditure without further appropriation by Congress. 16 U.S.C. § 6806.
Laws authorizing offsetting collections make them available for obligation to meet the account’s
purpose without further congressional action. Accordingly, because the receiving agency has the authority to
obligate and expend offsetting collections, offsetting collections constitute budget authority.4 Furthermore, as
discussed earlier in this chapter, an appropriation is authority to incur obligations and to make payments from the
Treasury for specified purposes. Thus, offsetting collections are an appropriation and are subject to the fiscal laws
governing appropriated funds. B-230110, Apr. 11, 1988; 63 Comp. Gen. 285 (1984).
In contrast, offsetting receipts are collections that cannot be obligated and expended without further
congressional action. Offsetting receipts are not available to an agency unless Congress appropriates them.5
Offsetting receipts are not available to the receiving agency for obligation; accordingly, offsetting receipts do not
constitute budget authority. An example of offsetting receipts is the motor vehicle and engine compliance program
fee collected by EPA. These fees are deposited into the Environmental Services Special Fund but are not available
to EPA without further appropriation. 42 U.S.C. § 7552.
See GAO OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS, ch. 2, at 2-6 (4th ed. 2016)
(GA0-16-464SP). While the classification of offsets as either collections or receipts is a matter that would
ordinarily be specified in enabling legislation, the more common practice for insurance premiums would be to
denominate such payments as offsetting collections, that is, as creating budget authority. That is our assumption
for purposes of this White Paper.
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Table One: Central Estimates of the Ten-Year Fiscal Impact of Candidates’ Health
Proposals

Table One illustrates the different fiscal presentations of the two different kinds
of health care reform. Due to their mandatory nature, the Sanders and Warren
proposals reflect substantial new revenues in the form of employer and worker
contributions along with substantial additional tax increases, generating between
$15 and over $20 trillion in new revenues over the ten-year window (but still adding
substantially to the federal deficit). The Biden and Buttigieg plans have a much
smaller fiscal footprint and not just because they are less ambitious programs. The
scoring for neither of these proposals includes direct offsets for premium payments
that individuals would pay toward premiums for the public option, consistent with
the treatment described above of offsetting collections in market-based transactions
government entities. To be sure, both the Biden and Buttigieg plans entail additional
federal expenditures to expand coverage (reflecting subsidies and tax credits), but
they do not reflect the entire cost of health care coverage for individuals who choose
to participate in the public option on a voluntary basis. While these differences may
sound technical in nature, the very large amount of new taxes required to finance the
Sanders and Warren MFA proposals proved to be a significant impediment in public
debates over the course of the democratic primaries and are likely to continue to act
as serious impediments to passage of such proposals.

Designing a Public Option for Employers with Budget Scoring in
Mind
So with this background in mind, how should an employer public option be
designed to capture current employer and employee contributions as offsets to
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expenditures, which would produce a budgetary impact that accurately reflects the
net costs to the federal government? First and foremost, the public option program
should be voluntary in nature and designed to compete with private employer plans,
as discussed above. Contributions should be made directly to the public option plan,
from both employers and employees, as is currently the case with private health
insurance plans. Structuring these payments as voluntary premiums instead of as
new taxes on employers who opt into the public option and on their employees is
critical. For budgetary purposes, taxes would likely be mandatory and considered
government revenues rather than offsetting collections and therefore included into
budgetary aggregates. 168
The precise budgetary impact of a public option for employers will depend on
numerous design choices discussed in detail in Part II: reimbursement rates for
medical care, whether contributions for an employer include experience adjustments
to reflect the health characteristics of its employees, the quality of the benefits
provided as well as out-of-pocket charges, and the amount and design of any
subsidies. 169
Following other public option proposals that have focused on employer
participation, we assume upward adjustment in hospital reimbursements rates above
current Medicare rates may be necessary. These adjustments would make a public
option for employers more palatable for many key constituencies (like hospitals and
other providers) but it should not generate the need for additional public
expenditures as premiums for current ESI plans support reimbursements at even
higher levels. While these upward adjustments would somewhat reduce savings for
employers and employees, our assumption is that the overall efficiencies of the
public option will still generate residual cost savings.
To the extent that public option plans retain some degree of out-of-pocket
expense for workers and dependents, flexible spending accounts offered under an
employer’s cafeteria plan could continue to be used to allow for the payment of these
out-of-pocket expenses with pre-tax dollars. 170 To the extent that a public option for
employers altered the extent of out-of-pocket expenditures for participating
employees, this aspect of a public plan would also have a fiscal impact, either
positive or negative.

Several public option proposals that envision mandatory employer payments to cover employees who opt
out of employer ESI and into a public option offered through an ACA exchange would also run the risk of being
denominated government revenues as opposed to offsetting collections.
169
Another potentially important consideration is the extent to which a public option for employers might have
an impact on the number of Medicare eligible employees choose to stay on their employer-sponsored plans.
Movement of significant numbers of elderly away from Medicare could reduce revenues for that program, but
replacing it with, most likely, greater revenues for the public option, as combined employer and employee
contributions to the public option would likely be greater than Medicare premiums. But the effects would need to
be considered in a comprehensive scoring exercise.
170
If the public option made high-deductible coverage available, health savings accounts could be used to pay
out-of-pocket expenses. A separate question might arise if employees participating in an employer-based public
option were to purchase Medigap-style supplement plans. The need for such plans would depend on the features of
the public option. Medigap premiums cannot generally be paid with pretax dollars. You can deduct them, but only
to the extent they, along with any other medical expenses, exceed ten percent of annual income. See I.R.C. §213
168
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a complete assessment of the
budgetary impact of the system of subsidies outlined in Part II. Clearly there would
be a direct budgetary impact as the federal government would be expanding the
scope of ACA subsidies beyond policies purchased on Exchanges. In addition, the
availability of these subsidies as well as the integration of Medicaid coverage into
employer-sponsored plans would reduce the costs of employer-provided insurance
(especially for lower income workers) and therefore likely increase the amount of
employer-sponsored coverage for those workers – a key benefit of our proposal, but
also an effect that would increase the level of tax expenditures for employer
sponsored health insurance. Furthermore, the approach we describe would likely
expand the number of individuals receiving Medicaid benefits (albeit primarily those
already eligible for those benefits but currently lacking the wherewithal to claim
their entitlements.) Finally, in calculating the overall cost of the program, CBO
scorekeepers would need to assess the extent to which Medicaid costs for lowerincome workers would be offset by reductions in ACA-style subsidies otherwise
directed to employer-provided plans.

Using Reconciliation to Enact an Employer Public Option
While this Article is primarily focused on sketching out a new approach to health
care reform, questions understandably may arise in some readers’ minds as to the
political viability of our proposal, especially given the closely divided composition
of the current U.S. Senate. That concern necessarily poses the question whether
legislation implementing a public option for employers – or even a simple public
option for individuals – could be structured to comply with budget reconciliation
procedures and hence avoid the Senate’s current filibuster requirements. In truth, a
definitive answer to this question would ultimately come from the Senate
Parliamentarian, but we believe there are solid grounds to believe that a public
option for employers could be structured to be eligible for inclusion in a
reconciliation bill.
The chief impediment to inclusion of legislation in reconciliation bills is the
Byrd Rule. 171 A number of the Byrd Rule’s limitations are inapplicable, such as
the prohibition on changes in social security, or relatively easy to meet through
advanced planning, such as the requirement that the legislation not fall outside of
the jurisdiction of the submitting committee or does not match the specifications of
the authorizing budget resolution. In addition, the budgetary effects of the public
option would need to be anticipated in the budget resolution issuing reconciliation
instructions. There are, however, several elements of the Byrd Rule that could
present challenges.
First is the Byrd Rule’s prohibition on provisions in a reconciliation bill that do
not “produce a change in outlays or revenue, including changes in outlays and
revenues brought about by changes in the terms and conditions under which outlays
are made or revenues are required to be collected.” 172 To meet this requirement, the
See Congressional Research Services, The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate’s “Byrd Rule” (Dec.
1, 2020).
172
See Section 313(b)(1)(A) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended.
171
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public option for employers would need to be crafted, in the first instance, as an
expansion of the traditional Medicare program to cover a new group of participants
on terms that would be competitive in the employer sponsored market. A provision
of this sort would fairly clearly increase federal outlays. As a second step, the
legislation could authorize the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (or some
other governmental entity) to establish a premium schedule for employer and
employee contributions to cover the costs of the public option. As discussed
elsewhere, these fees would not be denominated revenues in budgetary aggregates,
but they would reduce federal outlays as they would offset the costs of the programs.
Again, this approach would seem to meet the Byrd Rule’s requirements of directly
affecting (that is, decreasing) federal spending. Finally, to the extent that ACA
subsidies or some variant thereon were included in a public option, that expansion
would also seem to fall squarely within the permissible limits of reconciliation bills
as it directly increases in federal spending in the same manner as the creation of a
new tax expenditures.
To be sure, drafters would need to be careful not to include in any
reconciliation bill additional provisions with budgetary effects that are “merely
incidental to non-budgetary components.” 173 For this reason, there could be
advantages of hewing as closely as possible to the existing Medicare program with
delegated rulemaking authority to CMS to adopt programmatic adjustments, along
the lines discussed elsewhere in this article, in order to make the public option a
viable alternative to employer sponsored health insurance. Many reconciliation
bills in the past – including both the Affordable Care Act and Trump era tax reform
legislation -- have included such delegated authority and the purpose of such
delegation would be to fix “the terms and conditions under which outlays are made,”
that would seem to protect them from challenges that they were merely incidental to
budgetary effects. In a similar vein, CMS should also be authorized to determine
the extent to which employers adopting a public option would be relieved of
regulatory burdens under other federal provisions, such as ERISA, again justified
against Byrd Rule attack on the grounds that it determines the terms and conditions
under which outlays are made, as the terms of the public option for employers would
be different (and quite likely infeasible) were the programs subject to conflicting
federal statutory requirements.
A final issue under the Byrd Rule would be whether the public option for
employers increased the projected federal deficit beyond the current budget window,
presumably but not necessarily ten years. 174 The application of this requirement
would ultimately turn on scoring decisions by the Congressional Budget Office.
While it is conceivable that labor market effects of this public option would increase
employment growth and tax revenues beyond ten years and have other positive
budgetary effects related to increase competition in the private sector, one should
probably assume that over the ten year window the public option would increase the
projected deficit, particularly if ACA style subsidies were included. To address this
Id. Section 313(b)(1)(D).
Here the relevant subsection of the Byrd Rule reads: “a provision shall be considered to be extraneous if it
increases, or would increase, net outlays, or if it decreases, or would decrease, revenues during a fiscal year after
the fiscal years covered by such reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution. ” Id. Section 313(b)(1)(E).
173
174
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issues, proponents could explore pay-for options that would be expected to offset
outlays in the outyears, either related to health care reform or otherwise. An
alternative response would be to include a sunset provision – as has often been done
with tax legislation passed through reconciliation – in the final year of the budget
window. While arguably diminishing the attractiveness of the program for
employers contemplating adoption, a sunset in this case might actually be justified
here to the extent that one regards the public option for employers as experimental
measure, which over the coming decade will either prove itself to be a productive
step forward or not. But this final element of the Byrd Rule is one which would
need to be addressed in order to survive points of order in the Senate.

CONCLUSION
While recent health reform discussions have centered around Medicare for All
and an individual public option, we have proposed in this Article a novel employer
public option that addresses the shortcoming of such proposals. Medicare for All
moves all Americans onto a publicly-financed system which, while effective in
addressing many of the shortcomings of the U.S. system, does so in a highly
disruptive way that is likely to face strong political opposition. On the other hand,
the more politically-palatable individual public option may help improve coverage
at the margins, but is unlikely to significantly reform the U.S. health care system.
Our proposal attempts to find a middle ground, by allowing employers to lead the
movement toward public coverage to the extent they find doing so to be in their
interests. Creating a voluntary mechanism lead by sophisticated decisionmakers
should not only help lessen political opposition, but will also improve budget scoring
and fiscal impact. Most importantly, it has the ability to begin to meaningfully
address some of the most pressing health policy issues in the United States and can
serve as a genuine test of the viability of a broader system of public coverage.
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